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ABSTRACT 
This is a study of the internal structure of children's natural concepts. 
Categorizaton research is implicit to our understanding of how children think. 
The application of this information is basic to our understanding of cognitive 
development, semantics and the development of memory. The study 
investigated four issues. The fîrst issue dealt with whether children of 
different ages differ in the number of attributes they mention at the basic and 
superordinate levels for objects and scenes. The second issue considered was 
whether children of any age list significantly more attributes for basic level 
categories than they do for superordinate level categories. The third issue 
investigated was whether the most protoypical members of categories are those 
with the most attributes in common with other members of that category (i.e. 
family resemblance). The final issue studied was the effects of context on rated 
protoypicality. Will the item identified by children as most prototypical differ 
dependent upon the context provided by background scenes? 
The design used was a 3 (age) x 2 (sex) x 2 (type of task: object or scene) x 2 
(level of categorization: basic or superordinate) factorial design. Type of task 
and level of categorization are within-subject factors. Age and sex form the 
between-subject factors. Kindergarten (18 males and 18 females), second grade 
(18 males and 15 females) and fourth grade students (18 males and 17 females) 
&om a rural midwestem elementary school served as subjects. All subjects 
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participated in all of the tasks. The evidence shows first that fourth grade 
students list significantly more parts than the younger students. There was no 
significant difference between kindergarten and second grade performance. 
Secondly, the results indicate that all children listed significantly more 
attributes at the basic level than at the superordinate level. Finally the findings 
demonstrate that children of all three age groups do differ in the item they 
choose as most prototypical dependent upon the context of the background 
scene. With respect to the third issue the results were equivocal. The predicted 
relationship between family resemblance and prototypicality with children was 
not found and this issue needs further investigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Categorization is a basic tool children use for organizing their thoughts 
about their environment. Through categorization children make sense of the 
world in which they live. Therefore a developmental study of the formation 
and structure of children's conceptual categories is basic to our understanding of 
how children think. Currently much research attention in cognitive 
development, semantics and memory is focused on the formation and the 
structure of conceptual categories. In applied fields such as education and 
speech pathology this information can help in such areas of reading, writing, 
and language. Categorization is implicit to our understanding of the 
development of thought. 
For several decades the classical view of categorization has predominated. 
The essence of the classical view is that every category has a set of necessary and 
sufficient features. However, decades of research have failed to reveal defining 
features for many concepts. A good example would be the category or concept of 
game. While one can generally agree on what consititutes a game, defining 
those features that are present in each and every instance of it has proven to be 
impossible. 
Based on the difficulties encountered by the classical view of concept 
formation new views have developed. Rosch (1973,1975) describes categories as 
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internally structured into prototype and nonprototype members. She uses the 
concept of family resemblance suggested by the philosopher Wittgenstein (1953) 
to define prototypicality. Wittgenstein argued that a referent of a concept or 
category need not have all the elements used to define the category. He 
suggested that what might link the referents of a concept such as game is the 
family resemblance relationship. Such a relationship exists when each item in a 
category has as least one and probably several elements in common with one or 
more other items but no elements are necessarily common to all items. 
Prototypical items or members are those instances of the category that have the 
greatest number of attributes overlapping with other members of the category 
and the least number of items overlapping with items in other categories. In 
other words, they have the highest degree of family resemblance. 
The family resemblance relationship exists at all taxonomic levels. In a 
taxonomy there are several levels of abstraction: superordinate, basic level and 
subordinate. The superordinate level is illustrated by such categories as 
furniture and vehicles. The basic level includes categories such as chair and car. 
The subordinate level includes categories such as rocking chair and recliner. 
The basic level of abstraction is the level where categories carry the most 
information and are the most differentiated. This level is defined as the most 
inclusive level which reflects the structure of attributes perceived in the real 
world (Rosch et al., 1976). This is the most abstract level where instances of the 
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concept have roughly the same parts (Tversky & Hemenway, 1983). It is at the 
basic level that category members are most often described (Rosch et al., 1976). 
The basic level is the preferred level for categorization in terms of speed of 
categorization and ease of learning (Medin & Smith, 1984). It is the level 
preferred by parents in describing the world to their children (Brown, 1973; 
Tversky & Hemenway, 1983). For example, most parents will offer the name 
"dog" for a pet rather than "animal" or "dachshund." 
The superordinate level is one categorization level more abstract than the 
basic level. The categories at this level consist almost entirely of items related to 
each other through overlapping attributes forming a family resemblance 
relationship. People perceive members of the superordinate as having few 
common attributes and very few common behaviors (Rosch et al., 1976; Tversky 
& Hemenway, 1983). For example, it is easier to come up with parts and actions 
shared by a car and a truck rather than parts and actions shared by vehicles and 
furniture. Since they have fewer common attributes than the basic level they 
also have a lower total cue validity (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Cue validity is 
defined as the frequency of a cue associated with the category divided by the total 
frquency of the same cue over all relevant categories (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). 
The superordinate level of categorization has the advantage of consisting of a 
very finite number of basic level members. However the disadvantage is that 
this level does not have contrasting categories (Rosch, 1978; Rosch et al., 1976). 
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The subordinate category level is one level below the basic level. It contains 
many attributes that overlap with other subordinate level categories within the 
same taxonomy (Rosch, 1978). The subordinate level shares a few more 
attributes and behaviors than basic level but the increase is slight (Rosch et al., 
1976; Tversky & Hemenway, 1983). It has a lower total cue validity than basic 
level because attributes at this level are also shared more often with contrasting 
subordinate categories. For example, two types of cars such as a Volkswagen and 
a Porsche share many of the same attributes. They also share many attributes 
with the contrasting category of subordinate level trucks. Both a pick-up and a 
wrecker share many of the subordinate level attributes found in a Volkswagen 
and a Porsche. Therefore the total cue validity at the subordinate level is lower 
than at the basic level. 
Several studies have used subjects' listing of object attributes and actions to 
ditferentiate hierarchical levels ( Rosch, 1973; 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch 
et al., 1976; Tversky & Hemenway, 1983). Within each class, adults list 
significantly more attributes for basic level words than for superordinate level 
words. The basic level also offers the most inclusive level for similar sequences 
of motor movements (Rosch et al., 1976; Tversky & Hemenway, 1983) such as, 
for example, certain body movements normally associated with sitting in a chair 
or throwing of a ball. 
Children also appear to prefer basic level categorization. In a sorting task 
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Rosch et al. (1976) found preschoolers were significantly more accurate at sorting 
objects at the basic level. Mervis and Cisafi (1982) found children sorted at the 
basic level more accurately than they did at the superordinate or subordinate 
levels. They reasoned this was because the basic level categories were more 
differentiated from one another than categories at other hierarchical levels. The 
children also acquired basic level names before names at other hierarchical 
levels (Brown, 1973). 
Tversky and Hemenway (1983) presented evidence that adults 
taxonomically group scenes in a manner analogous to object grouping. The 
researchers measured the features associated with the different levels of 
abstraction. Both measures of appearance and activities were taken into 
account. Their adult subjects had a preferred or basic level for scene use and 
scene naming. Superordinate level scenes had fewer attributes in common than 
the basic level scenes. They were also not often used in labeling. The 
subordinate level did not share appreciably more features. The use of a basic 
level of categorization for scenes has not been investigated in children. No 
research to date has looked at whether children develop a taxonomy for scenes. 
The present study is comprised of several parts. The first three parts of the 
study are an attempt to replicate and extend the findings of Rosch and Mervis 
(1975), Rosch et al. (1976) and Tversky and Hemenway (1983). In the first part, 
the issue investigated was whether children of different ages differ in the 
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number of attributes they mention at the the basic and superordinate level for 
objects and scenes. The second part of the study looked at whether children of 
any age list significantly more attributes for basic level categories than for 
superordinate level categories. The third portion of the study investigated the 
relationship between degree of family resemblance and rated prototypicality. 
The question asked about both objects and scenes was, are the most prototypical 
members of categories those with the most attributes in common with other 
members of that category? 
The final portion of the study investigated the effect of context on rated 
prototypicality. Using adult subjects. Roth and Shoben (1983) demonstrated that 
context influences the ordering of what is seen as representative among category 
exemplars. Typicality rating without context did not correspond to those ratings 
when context was introduced. Furthermore, it has been postulated that context 
may enhance the salience of some features (Tversky & Gati, 1978). When the 
context is modified there is an increase in the diagnositic value of certain 
features. This will affect the objects' perceived similarity. It is hypothesized that 
within each age group the most prototypical object will differ dependent upon 
the context provided by the background scene. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theory 
Currently much cognitive research attention centers on how people 
form and use concepts and how they develop a taxonomy of categories to 
express relationships between classes (Medin & Smith, 1984). Several 
different views on the structure, function and development of concepts have 
been proposed. For several decades one particular view of concept structure 
was predominant, namely, the classical view. 
Classical Theory 
The classical view is based on three specific assumptions (Smith and 
Medin, 1981). The first is that the representation of a concept is a 
summarized description of a class. According to Smith and Medin (1981), in 
this theory there is a unitary description of class properties. This description 
must apply to all possible instances of the class. Categorization is generally 
seen as a means to reduce the infinite differences among stimuli to 
cognitively and behaviorally managable proportions. As the classical view 
proposes, categorization condenses a concept to a single summary 
description. This greatly reduces the amount of information that needs to be 
stored mnemonically. 
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Secondly, it is suggested that every concept has a set of features that are 
singularly necessary and jointly sufficient to define the concept. Singularly 
necessary means that every instance of the concept must possess the feature. 
For example, all chairs must have legs. Jointly sufficient means that every 
instance incorporating the set of features must be an instance of the concept. 
For example, in order for a shape to be a square, it must be a parallelogram 
with sides of equal length and having four 90° angles. 
The third assumption of the classical view pertains to the relationship 
between sets and subsets. It states that if a concept, X, is a subset of another 
concept, Y, then the defining features of Y are nested in those of X. For 
example, the defining features of dog are nested in those of German shepard 
since a German shepard is a kind of dog. 
These three assumptions of the classical view formed the background for 
most of the work on concepts and concept formation for many decades 
(Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 1956; Flavell, 1970). However, there are major 
difficulties with the classical view. The most profound argument against it 
has to do with the second assumption, namely, that every concept has a set of 
necessary and sufficient features. Decades of research have failed to come up 
with necessary and sufficient features for many concepts. Good examples 
would include such things as a chair. While one can generally agree what it 
is when it is seen, it becomes difficult to establish features that must be 
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present to define it. Some chairs have legs while others have stands; some 
have a back and others do not. One sits on most chairs, but on some one 
kneels and on others one reclines. It is suggested that for many concepts no 
set of defining features, - features that are necessary and sufficient-, can be 
established. This was most throughly pursued by Wittgenstein (1953) in his 
well known critique of the classical view. 
A second argument against the classical view is based on the lack of clear 
cut category boundaries. According to the classical view, category 
membership is based on defining features and therefore category boundaries 
should be clear cut. However, people have difficulty with determining 
categorical boundaries. For example, should a rug be considered a type of 
furniture, and is a tomato a fruit or a vegetable? Further difficulties with 
this assumption were discovered by Hampton (1979). It appears that people 
use nonnecessary features in categorization. Hampton (1979) listed features 
characterizing concepts and rated the extent to which subsets had those same 
features. These ratings were used to predict categorization times for another 
group of subjects. The more features were shared by a concept, the faster 
members could be categorized. Some of the features that were listed were 
nonnecessary ones and these were also correlated with categorization 
performance. 
The third argument against the classical view is that it excludes 
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disjunctive concepts. The meaning of a concept includes not only its set of 
defining attributes or features but also refers to how the attributes are 
interrelated in the definition of the concept. Bruner, Goodnow and Austin 
(1956) have defined disjunctive concepts. If two features must both be 
present for an instance to be a concept member, the concept is called 
disjunctive. For example, a bachelor must be both male and unmarried. 
An instance of a disjunctive concept either has features A, B, C, D or X, Y, 
W, and Z. For example, in baseball an "out" can be achieved in a number of 
ways: the person can strike out, can be tagged out, or a fly ball can be caught. 
These methods for obtaining an out are in no way related. That is, different 
instances of a concept do not need to have features in common. Their 
features are totally disjunctive. This means that for the concept of "out" 
there are no necessary features. As such, disjunctive relationships violate 
the classical assumptions concerning defining features. 
A final criticism of the classical view argues that it only deals with 
structural features. For example, a structural feature of a soccer ball is 
curvature. This disregards functional features such as bouncing and rolling. 
Because of this alleged exclusion of functional features, it is argued by Nelson 
(1974) and Anglin (1977) that the classical view cannot handle the concepts 
where defining features are functional in nature. 
Based on the difficulties encountered by the classical theory of concepts. 
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new views were developed. These include three types of probabilistic 
theories: the featural approach, the dimensional approach, and the holistic 
approach (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
The probabilistic theories developed from the theory of Wittgenstein 
(1953) and the work of Labov (1973). Labov argued that people's concept of 
an object such as "cup" does not incorporate properties true for all members. 
Instead he suggested that it is necessary to think in terms of a description true 
for most but not all members. Therefore, some of the instances will have 
more of the critical properties than others. Those that have more of these 
properties will seem more representative. 
The featural approach applies the probabilistic theory to feature subsets. 
The representation of a concept is assumed to be an abstraction process that 
may not be realizable Arom an one concept member. Since features vary in 
both salience and probability of occurrence, these variations must be 
indicated within the concept representation. Those features having the 
highest probability of occurrence become modal features of the concept. For 
example, most dogs have fur, paws and a tail. Therefore any concept is a 
central tendency representation of member properties. An entity is 
considered an instance of a concept if it possesses some critical sum of 
weighted features (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
This explanation can handle all the problems encountered by the 
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classical view. The problem of necessary and sufficient features is handled 
straightforwardly. No such restrictions are made. Instead a family 
resemblance relationship is proposed. The featural approach also accounts 
for lack of clear-cut category boundaries for things such as tomatoes. These 
unclear cases arise when either the accumulated weighted feature sum is 
near but not over the criterion value for a target concept and/or when the 
potential instance accumulates comparable feature sums from more than 
one concept. 
The featural approach can also handle disjunctive concepts. Since 
category membership is based on a weighted sum of the features, the same 
sum can be achieved by various feature combinations or various feature set 
combinations. Finally, no specification of feature type is made in this theory. 
Therefore, functional as well as structural features are considered (Smith & 
Medin, 1981). 
The dimensional approach is more specific than the featural approach. 
Like the latter, the dimensional approach assumes that the concept 
representation is a summary description applying to all instances. The 
second assumption is that any dimension used to represent a concept must 
be salient and that the value of the represented dimension is the mean of the 
concept instances on that dimension. In a dimensional approach weights are 
used to indicate the important dimensional variations in concept 
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membership. The advantage of this approach is seen with continuous 
variables such as size or weight. It allows for concepts to depict the average 
or mean dimension values while the featural approach depicted only the 
modal feature values. In addition, most dimensional theories contain a 
third assumption: concepts having the same relevant dimensions may be 
represented as points in multidimensional metric space (Smith & Medin, 
1981). This accords major advantages, because with this assumption the 
models can be based on distance computations rather than probability 
computations. The values of each concept instance are implicitly stated by 
their location in space. It is necessary to consider the dimensional values of 
points designating the test item and target concept as well as the metric 
distance between them. For this reason, dimensional theory proponents 
suggest that concepts are not decomposed into their component properties 
during categorization but rather are mulitdimensional gestalts. 
The comparative distance model also has an additional assumption: in 
categorization it is necessary to consider not only the distance between the 
test item and the concept but also the distance between the test item and 
concepts that contrast with the target. An item is categorized as an instance 
of a concept if and only if the metric distance between the item and the 
concept is less than between the item and any concept that contrasts with the 
concept under consideration. 
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The disadvantages of this approach include all those of the featural 
approach. The representation of knowledge is still too limited by this 
approach. It does deal better than the featural approach with dimensional 
values, but still fails to account for relational values. It also fails to provide 
necessary constraints on what is a necessary and nonnecessary dimensional 
value. Finally, it does not account for context effects any better than the 
featural model. In addition, the metric distance assumption proposed in this 
model has been unable to address difficulties encountered through empirical 
challenges (Tversky, 1977). It appears doubtful that some concepts can be 
represented in metric space without violating the basic assumptions of 
metric distance (Smith and Medin, 1981). 
The final approach to the probablistic theory is the holistic or template 
approach. As the word template suggests, this approach does not deal with 
features or multidimensional space. Instead, the first assumption of this 
theory demands that the conceptual image look like the object it represents. 
It is isomorphic to the item it represents. Templates are unanalyzable 
wholes. No part of a template can be singled out and interpreted alone. As 
such, templates are often thought to be inherently relational gestalts (Smith 
& Medin, 1981). Obviously this conceptual system can only be used to 
represent concrete objects. To date no template theory of conceptual 
representation has been proposed. However, it is a portion of at least one 
15 
theory. Palmer (1978) has incorporated conceptual templates in his theory of 
color. He suggests that a template is analogous to a matrix grid. Each cell is 
defined by its position and color. The position is determined by vertical and 
horizontal coordinates. The color is either black or white and corresponds to 
filled or unfilled space. The second assumption logically follows: the color 
value of each cell of a template which represents a concept is the most 
frequently occurring or probable value for the cells of its instances. The 
template for a concept need not perfectly match every instance; it serves only 
as a probablistic guide (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
The immediate advantage of this theory is its potential explanation for 
the process involved in prototyping. It appears that three factors need to be 
considered when determining how well an instance corresponds to the 
prototype: 1) the number of instances which are presented, 2) the average 
distortion of the instances from the prototype and 3) the finite clarity of the 
cell matrix that defines the instance and template. The more exposure to 
instances of the template and the more clear the instances, the more the 
template should approximate a prototype. This template approach is still in 
early developmental phases. It has been used by cognitive theorists who are 
interested in computerized pattern recognition applications of cognitive 
theory. 
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figgçh's Thggry 
Rosch (1978) has proposed two general principles that supposedly 
underlie human categorization systems. Her first principle has to do with 
the function of category systems and asserts that category systems are meant 
to provide maximal information while expending minimum cognitive 
effort. The second principle has to do with the information that is provided. 
It asserts that the perceived world is received as structured information. 
Objects in the world are perceived as having a high correlational structure. 
In other words, features in our natural environment do not occur at 
random; the environment is highly structured. Natural categories are 
formed to take advantage of attribute grouping within our environment 
(Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem, 1976). People are sensitive to 
these attribute groups when making categorization decisions (Malt & Smith 
1984; Medin & Smith, 1984). While it is currently unclear how the correct 
correlated attributes are chosen (Medin & Smith, 1984; Keil, 1981), these 
correlated attributes help coalesce the structure of categories (Rosch, 1978). 
According to the first principle, categorization is a process used to 
organize and simplify knowledge (Tversky & Hemenway, 1983). This first 
principle is used to decide whether or not an object belongs to a class (Medin 
& Smith, 1984), to consider whether an object is equivalent to other stimuli 
in the same category and also different from stimuli not in that category 
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(Rosch; Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Through 
categorization it is possible to reduce the infinite differences among stimuli 
to behaviorally useful proportions (Rosch et al., 1976). 
Rosch (1978) suggests that category systems be conceived as 
two-dimensional structures. The dimension along which the terms collie, 
dog, mammal, animal and living thing vary is taxonomical. A taxonomy is 
a class inclusion system through which categories are related to one another. 
Categories are nested into more inclusive and abstract groupings. Within a 
taxonomy, each category is entirely included within another unless it is the 
highest level category. The greater a category's inclusiveness, the higher the 
level of abstraction. The horizontal dimension concerns the partitioning of 
categories at the same level of inclusiveness, the dimension on which dog, 
and cat, and car and bus vary. The vertical dimension concerns the level of 
inclusiveness of the category. For example, how do car and truck vary or 
fruit and vegtables vary ? With respect to the vertical dimension, Rosch 
(1978) argues that not all levels of categorization are equally useful, but that 
the most basic level will be that level of inclusiveness or abstraction at which 
the categories can represent the structure of attributes in the world. 
Rosch's claims regarding a basic level of inclusiveness with respect to the 
vertical dimension can be restated in terms of cue validity. Cue validity can 
be defined as the probability that a given cue is a predictor of a given category. 
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Attributes most distributed among category members and least distributed 
among members of contrasting categories are the most valid cues for category 
membership (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). The cue validity increases as the cue 
is more frequently associated with a given category. It decreases as the cue is 
more frequently associated with categories other than the given category 
(Rosch et al., 1976). 
A category's cue validity refers to the sum of cue validities of each of the 
attributes of a category. In a taxonomy, there are several levels of abstraction: 
superordinate, basic level and subordinate. Basic level objects reveal 
maximal cue validity for categories. This is based on difference scores 
derived by comparing the within-category similarity of each category level 
with their between-category similarity. The superordinate level has fewer 
attributes in common and therefore a low within-category similarity. 
However, it also has an extremely low between-category similarity. This 
yields a lower differentiation score than the basic level. The subordinate 
level shares the most attributes with contrasting subordinate categories, 
giving a high within-category similarity but also an unusually high 
between-category similarity value. This leaves them with the lowest 
differentiation score (Mervis & Crisafi, 1982). 
The horizontal dimension of the categorization system model deals with 
the segmentation of categories at the same level of inclusiveness. To 
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increase the distinctiveness and flexibility of categories, the categories are 
defined in terms of prototypes. Prototypes are the clearest cases of category 
membership defined operationally by people's judgments of goodness of 
example within the category. They are the instances containing attributes 
most representative of items inside the category and least representative of 
items outside the category (Rosch, 1978). According to Palmer (1978), 
prototypes are highly resolved, mnemonically stored categorical 
representations. A category member that is rated as more prototypical shares 
more attributes with other category members within the category and the 
fewer attributes with members of contrasting categories (Rosch & Mervis, 
1975). It is hypothesized by Rosch (1978) that within a category prototypes 
maximalize the category resemblance. Members of a category are viewed as 
prototypical of the category in proportion to the extent to which they bear a 
family resemblance. When the internal structure of categories is defined by 
subjects' judgment of the degree to which members fit their idea or image of 
a category, then the prototype should coincide with cue validity (Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975). 
Prototypes are thought to be stimuli which are salient prior to the 
category's formation. This salience determines the categorical structure. 
Categories may be represented by their individual exemplars, and 
assignment of a new instance to a category is determined by whether the 
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instance is sufficiently similar to one or more of the category's known 
exemplars (Medin & Smith, 1984). 
The Role of Context in the Internal Structure of Concepts 
While there is ample evidence that context can affect concept usage, 
little theoretical progress has been made in dealing with context effects. 
Neither the feature nor prototype theorists have considered the role of 
context in their theories. Rosch concedes that the influence of context on 
basic level categorization and prototypes is at this time relatively unknown 
(Rosch, 1978). She speculates that context should affect the level for naming 
objects and of abstracting their features. When a context is not specified in an 
experiment, the subjects must contribute their own. She hypothesizes that 
subjects mentally supply the context or situation for the objects when none is 
given to them; the ones they supply are those occurring in their daily lives 
(Rosch, 1978). Smith (1978) avoided dealing with context effects in relation to 
the featural model. 
Using adult subjects. Roth and Shoben (1983) demonstrated that context 
influences the ordering of what is seen as representative among category 
exemplars. Typicality ratings without context did not correspond to those 
rating when context was introduced. This representativeness in a context is 
an important determiner of how easily an exemplar can be identified as a 
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category member. As the context becomes more constrained the referents 
become specific. The referents in these specific situations are different from 
the most characteristic member in less restrictive contexts. They have 
attributes that differ from those of the prototype in less restrictive contexts. 
Further, certain terms that designate superordinate object concepts are 
affected by context. Some terms denote both a general class and a specific 
subset of that class. For example, "animal" when referenced to the planet 
refers to all living animate creatures while in reference to the farm refers to 
all domesticated animate creatures. 
The role of context in prototype theory has received most theoretical 
attention by Tversky and Gati (1978). In a series of studies using adult 
subjects and a geographic theme, they investigated the eHect of extended 
context by enlarging the object set. Subjects originally grouped together 
countries that had similar topography. Pkwever, when the context was 
enlarged by considering more countries, this association was less likely. New 
features then acquired diagnostic value. People organize stimuli into 
clusters to reduce the information load and facilitate processing. The 
similarity of pairs of objects in the original context is more limited than in 
the extended context. When context is modified there is an increase in the 
diagnostic value of certain features and this will affect the objects' perceived 
similarity (Tversky & Gati, 1978). 
22 
Contextual theorists are proposing new ways to view children's 
relationship with their surroundings. This effort seeks to relate children's 
development with variations in their environment (Fisher & Silvern, 1985). 
Enviroiunental and organismic factors are conditions of development 
(Fisher & Silvern, 1985). Individual characteristics can only be meaningfully 
interpreted in relation to particular contexts (Fisher & Silvern, 1985). 
Developmental stages reflect the acquisition of specific cognitive functions 
under a limited set of environmental conditions. Individual and cultural 
differences will be reflected within these sequences (Fisher & Silvern, 1985). 
The role of context in conceptual acquisition has been integrated into a 
variety of developmental theories (Fisher & Silvern, 1985; Mc Call, 1981; 
Scarr & McCartney, 1983). An example of the need for coordinating 
contextual influences with developmental level was demonstrated by 
Gelman (1978). She found that by simplifying Piagetian conservation tasks, 
preschool children could express number conservation skills. This indicates 
that contextual change allows one to assess different steps in the 
development of number conservation (Fisher & Silvern, 1985). 
The term probabilistic epigenesis has been coined to refer to the fact that 
individuals develop and function differently in varying contexts (Fisher & 
Silvern, 1985). Since neither an individual nor the environment is fixed, 
different individuals should show different developmental patterns. As 
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children encounter systematically diverse environments they will differ 
developmentally. There is also the possibility of environmentally based 
differences in sequences. For example, Greenfield and Smith (1976) found 
variation in toddlers' first fifty words based on individual environments. A 
general developmental sequence can be seen only when performance and 
assessment conditions are described quite abstractly (Fisher & Silvern, 1985). 
Placet's Theorv of Concept Development 
The most influential viewpoint on how concepts develop has been 
proposed by Fiaget (1981) and Inhelder and Piaget (1964). The later felt that 
young children's classificatory behavior was deficient in comparison to that 
of adults and older children. Piaget approaches classification as a 
developmental product of operational thought. A class presupposes 
classification, kihelder and Piaget (1964) proposed three phases to the 
development of classification. In the initial phase, graphic collections, 
objects are grouped by different criteria. From approximately age two to four 
and a half, "preconceptual" children arrange objects in patterns of adjacent 
pieces. They appear to become distracted by either the arrangement or 
feature similarity and consequently change the basis of classification. At this 
age, the children have a basic understanding of how individual objects are 
used. However, they cannot yet cope with general classes (Piaget, 1981). 
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During the next phase, nongraphic collections/ children from 
approximately age four and a half to age six group on the basis of similarity. 
The child successively groups a series of similar objects but does not attempt 
to place them in a configurational structure. For example, the child may 
clump all of the cars together and all of the trucks together. However, he 
will not place them in a line for a race. 
There are four subphases to this stage of development. During the 
initial subphase, the child forms a number of groups based on different 
criteria with only some of the objects in the array assigned to each group. In 
the second subphase, the groups are still arranged based on differing criteria 
but all the objects are used. In contrast to the first subphase, there is no 
unclassified remainder. During the third subphase, children assign objects to 
groups based on a single stable criterion. The multiple criteria grouping is 
omitted. Finally in the fourth subphase, the children form groups on the 
basis of one criterion and subdivide according to another stable criterion. 
The next major step is from intuitive to operational thought. This 
occurs according to Piaget and Inhelder between approximately six and seven 
years of age. Concrete operational thought does not require the child to be 
centered on a particular state of an object or point of view. Yet the child is 
still dependent on the presence of objects to manipulate. Until operational 
thought is evidenced, Piaget (1981) proposes that the child's thought remains 
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intuitive. It is based on an action carried out in thought. Thought is 
constantly related to the present action. 
In recent years developmental theorists have questioned the validity of 
Inhelder and Piaget's (1964) theory of classification development. Much of 
the recent work in free classification suggests that young children can and do 
sort taxonomically according to a consistent set of criteria with no remainder 
or overlap (Ricciuti, 1965; Ross, 1980; Smith & Rizzo, 1982; Sugarman, 1982). 
Children sort first at the basic level and then at the superordinate level 
(Rosch et al., 1976). This has forced researchers to question Inhelder and 
Piaget's (1964) description of free classification development. 
For the child to quickly and effidentiy master the environment, stable 
category formation is necessary. In other words, the child must discover 
consistent similar characteristics among objects. This provides an 
economical means for assimilating unfamiliar instances into what is already 
known. The child can recognize that the new object belongs in the same set 
as the known set of objects. This offers the child a basis for generalizing 
information to appropriate instances. If the child is inclined to organize his 
environment in terms of basic categories, he then has a basis for generalizing 
large amounts of information to the largest number of objects (Gelman & 
Baillargeon, 1983). 
Many researchers have confirmed Inhelder and Piaget's (1964) claim that 
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young children do not as readily sort objects at the superordinate level 
(Flavell, 1970). Gelman and Baillargeon (1983) suggest Aat extraneous factors 
influence children's difficulty with hierarchical classification. Several of 
these factors include mode of stimuli presentation, the readiness with which 
stimuli can be subsumed under a single, conventional label and style of 
organization (Miller, 1978, Miller & Barg, 1982). 
Another reason children may fail to group objects at the superordinate 
level is that they are incapable of uncovering criteria that can serve as the 
basis for classification (Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983). This differs markedly 
from Inhelder and Piaget's (1964) claim that the children are incapable of 
adhering to the same criterion throughout classification. At the basic level, 
the children have salient properties of shape and relative size. The 
categories have perceptually clear cut boundaries (Rosch et al., 1976). 
However, the superordinate categories have more dimensions that need to 
be ignored. The basis for classification is less salient (Gelman & Baillargeon, 
1983). Therefore, the argument becomes not whether one can sort on a 
single, stable criterion but which criteria need to be considered (Gelman & 
Baillargeon, 1983, Rosch et al., 1976). 
Recently Gelman has challenged Inhelder and Piaget's claim that the 
only important way knowledge is organized is in terms of classes and 
hierarchies of classes (Gelman, Bullock & Meek, 1980; Gelman & Baillargeon, 
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1983). An alternative view is based on part-whole relationship (Markman & 
Seibert, 1976). The rationale is as follows: in standard classification, 
superordinate classes lack psychological coherence once they are separated into 
subclasses. Therefore, class membership is determined based only on properties 
of individual objects. Collections (such as forest, family, bouquet) are an another 
way to organize knowledge. Collections have greater coherence since they are 
spatially proximal. The properties of the individual elements as well as the 
particular relationship between them are considered (Markman & Seibert, 1976; 
Markman, Horton, & McLanahan, 1980). Contrary to Inhelder and Piaget's claim 
it appears that from a young age both collection and class forms of hierarchical 
organization are available to children. Since the part-whole organization is 
psychologically simpler, it is preferred in ambiguous situations. 
Children's tendency to group objects into wholes, such as patterns, stories or 
scenes, may indicate a preference for this part-whole organization. Its preference 
is rooted not so much in the child's developing capacity, but in the 
organizational structure. Therefore, the development that does take place in 
terms of establishing, maintaining and operating each type of organizational 
form takes place over a considerable period of time and represents an 
improvement in degree rather than kind (Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983). 
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Studies 
Research on Prototypes and Family Resemblance 
Two complementary principles of taxonomic structure are currently 
receiving research attention - family resemblance and prototypicality. The 
research on both has had a major influence on how categorization is viewed 
because the classical Aieory of categorization cannot deal with either principle. 
A family resemblance relationship exists where each item in a category has at 
least one and probably several elements in common with one or more other 
items in the category. Few or no attributes are common to all items. Rosch 
and Mervis (1975) view natural semantic categories as an instance of a network 
of overlapping attributes. 
Prototypes are the clearest cases of category membership defined 
operationally by people's judgments of goodness of membership within the 
category. These prototypical instances contain the attributes most 
representative of items contained within the category and least representative 
of items outside it (Rosch, 1978). They contain features which are 
nonnecessary for categorization but typical (Hampton, 1979; Rosch & Mervis, 
1975). Categories tend to become defined in terms of these prototypes. Rosch 
(1973) found that semantic categories develop around perceptually salient 
exemplars. 
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Studies Using Adults as Subfects Studies using adult subjects showed 
that prototypes were more rapidly learned and more often chosen as category 
exemplars than other stimuli (Rosch, 1973). They are the members named 
first when adults are asked to produce all members of a category (Mervis, 
Catlin & Rosch, 1976). Further evidence comes from studies of artificial 
concepts (Rips, Shoben & Smith; 1973; Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch 
Simpson & Miller, 1976). Rosch and Mervis (1975) used strings of letters to 
form artificial concepts. They found that items judged to be typical members 
of a concept are categorized more efficiently than less typical members. The 
results were confirmed by Rosch, Simpson and Miller (1976). This evidence 
suggests that adults can rate various subsets with respect to typicality. These 
ratings then predict how efficiently people can categorize concept members. 
These ratings are relatively uncorrelated with frequency or familiarity (Mervis, 
Catlin & Rosch, 1976). When test items were more prototypical, categorization 
time decreased (Rips, Shoben & Smith, 1973; Rosch, 1973). In other words, 
concepts possess an internal structure that favors typical members over less 
typical ones. This directly violates the classical view that all members of a 
concept are equal since they have the defining feature of the superordinate 
concept (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
Rosch and Mervis (1975) have shown that a consistent positive 
relationship exists between prototypes and family resemblance. Using adult 
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subjects they found that prototypical category members are those with the 
most attributes in common with members of the category and the least 
attributes in common with other categories. In other words, prototypicality is 
a function of total cue validity. Adult subjects were asked to list attributes of 
objects that had been previously rated by other subjects for prototypicality. 
High positive correlations were found between those ratings and the extent of 
distribution of an item's attributes among other items of the category. Within 
superordinate categories negative correlations were obtained between 
prototypicality and a family resemblance for attributes of other categories. 
When artificial categories were constructed using strings of letters, cue validity 
or family resemblance was correlated with ease of learning, identification 
reaction time, and rating of prototypicality. These results again suggest that 
the distribution of attributes is the cause of prototypicality effects. The 
prototypicality scores are highly correlated with variations in family 
resemblance scores. The variations in family resemblance scores are due to 
features that are common to only some of the members. These variations 
cannot be explained in terms of defining features. Therefore, prototypicality 
variations must be accounted for in terms of nondefining features. The 
classical view does not allow for this (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
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Studies Using Children as Subjects Prototypes seem to play a 
fundamental role in the development of categorization. It is generally found 
that for younger children prototypes are based on appearances. Children rely 
on perceptual properties to infer category membership (Gelman, CoUman, 
Maccoby, 1986). These prototypes are initially based on a few salient features. 
Over time, other features are added (Frith & Frith, 1978). Mervis and Pani 
(1980) confirm these results with children and adults in a study that used 
artificial objects that were designed to form categories. Both children and 
adults learned categories more easily and more accurately when they were 
exposed to prototypes. 
In a recent habituation paradigm, prototypes have been shown to facilitate 
conceptual acquisition in seven to nine month-old prelinguistic infants 
(Roberts & Horowitz, 1986). Horton and Markman (1980) also studied the role 
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of exemplars or prototypes in acquiring basic and superordinate categories. 
Preschool, kindergarten and first grade children were asked to learn artificial 
animal categories. Each child was taught one category through exemplar 
information and a second category through exemplar information and 
linguistic description of the critical features. It was found that use of the 
exemplar information was the basis for basic level category learning. 
However, kindergarten and first grade children acquired superordinate level 
category information better when they were informed of critical features. The 
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preschool children did not benefit from the criteria information. Prototype 
information based on perceptual similarity was sufficient to support basic level 
acquisition. However, the perceptual diversity of the superordinate level 
items makes this strategy insufficient. Horton and Markman (1980) suggest 
that the younger children can understand the linguistic information but may 
not be able to systematically compare die descriptions against the potential 
referents. 
Offenbach (1980) compared third grade children's learning when the 
exemplar was present and absent. He found that absence of the exemplar 
interfered with learning a categorized set of objects. The amount of learning 
interference was dependent on the set. For example, learning size 
discrimination proceeds faster than learning form discrimination. In fact, 
children learned size discrimination when the prototype was unavailable 
faster than they learned form discrimination when the prototype was 
available. It appears that when all simple prototypes are eliminated, children 
try to form new conditional ones. The ease of forming new prototypes is 
dependent upon the salience of the prototypic features in the remainder of the 
set. 
Several studies have used subjects' listing of object parts and naming of 
objects' actions to differentiate hierarchical levels within categories. People's 
categorizations in the concrete world are highly determined by the 
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co-occurrence of object attributes which provide the basis for real world 
categorical structure (Rosch et al., 1976). Taxonomies of common concrete 
objects are organized in a class inclusion system. Adults list significantly more 
attributes for basic level words, such as cat or chair, than they do for 
superordinate level words such as animal or furniture (Malt & Smith, 1984; 
Rosch et al.,1976). Further, the distribution of attributes changes between 
hierarchical levels. The number of general functional attributes is markedly 
greater for die superordinate level than other levels, while the number of 
noun or adjective attributes is proportionately greater at the basic level (Malt & 
Smith, 1984; Rosch et al., 1976). Another differentiation is in listing of similar 
sequences of motor movements. It was found that basic level objects offer the 
most inclusive level for similar sequences of motor movements (Rosch et 
al.,1976; Tversky & Hemenway, 1983). For example, a ball can be bounced, 
thrown, dropped, passed, shot, dribbled or kicked whereas the list of activities 
associated with the word toy is much less inclusive. Basic objects are the most 
inclusive category level where members possess a significant number of 
common attributes (Malt & Smith, 1984; Rosch et al., 1976), have similar 
motor programs (Heidenheimer, 1978; Rosch et al., 1976), have similar shapes 
and can be identified from the averaged shapes of class members (Rosch et al., 
1976). Several implications of this category structure have been substantiated. 
The basic level objects are the most inclusive category level where a concrete 
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image of the whole category can be formed (Malt & Smith, 1984; Rosch et al., 
1976). It is the most codable category level and the level most often used in 
language (Rosch et al., 1976). 
Children appear to sort first at the basic level and then at the 
superordinate level (Rosch et al., 1976). The primacy of the basic level has 
been demonstrated not only in sorting but also in actions upon objects 
(Nelson, 1977) and in spontaneous word choices for concepts (Anglin, 1977; 
Rosch et al., 1976). These basic categories are particularly adaptive for young 
children. At this level, attributes in the real world mirror the correlational 
structure of the environment. For example, most birds have both feathers and 
wings, most cars have wheels and a steering wheel and most chairs have a seat 
and legs. At the same time, it is still a level that helps reduce the infinite 
differences in objects to behaviorally useful proportions. 
Several studies have used objects from natural categories, objects 
occurring in the natural world, to provide support for the developmental 
primacy of basic level over superordinate categorization (Anglin, 1977; Clark, 
1978; Rosch et al., 1976; Sugarman, 1979). Children acquire these concepts from 
basic to superordinate to subordinate. Rosch et al. (1976) demonstrated that 
sorting into basic level categories occurs at an early age and independent of 
superordinate sorting. Preschool (three and four year olds) and elementary 
grade school children (kindergarten, first, third and fifth grade) were asked to 
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sort sets of color photos of common animals and vehicles. There were four 
pictures for each basic level category (cats, dogs, butterflies, fish, cars, trains, 
motorcycles and airplanes). Two sets of triads were used. In one triad pictures 
could be paired only at the basic level and in the other triads, pictures could 
only be paired at the superordinate level. The triads were presented to the 
children one at a time. In the sorting task the children were asked to point to 
or put together the ones that were alike. In the naming task they were asked 
why the ones they chose belonged together. Half of the subjects within each 
age group performed this sorting task at the basic level and half at the 
superordinate level. For all age levels sorting at the basic level was virtually 
perfect. At the superordinate level three year olds sorted aproximately 55% 
correctly and four year olds 96% correctly. There were no sex differences. The 
results confirmed the prediction that basic level would be sorted correctly 
significantly more often than the superordinate level. The basic level 
distinctions were sorted and named by most children while sorting and 
naming at the superordinate level improved with age. For all children, 
sorting was better than naming the pairs correctly. Significant differences were 
found at each grade level between sorting and naming. With the exception of 
the three year olds where naming was poor for both vehicles and animals, at 
all grade levels naming the pairs correctly was better for animals than vehicles. 
In a follow up experiment a standard sorting task was used with 
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kindergarten, first, third and fifth grade students. In each group half of the 
subjects were female. Color photos of three categories were divided into 
superordinate and basic level classes. At the basic level four pictures of each of 
the basic level classes were used (i.e., four pictures of chairs, four of beds). 
There were four sets that could be sorted at the basic level and four at the 
superordinate level. Two subjects at each age level received each basic level 
set and two subjects at each age level received each superordinate level set. 
Each child was told to "put together the ones that go together, the ones that are 
the same kind of thing." The children were encouraged to use all the pictures 
in the groupings. Correct grouping consisted of four groups of four pictures 
corresponding to the taxonomic grouping. The subject was then asked why 
those pictures were placed together. The results were similar to the previous 
experiment. Again no sex differences were found. With the exception of one 
kindergarten and one first grade child, ail basic level sorting was taxonomically 
correct. For the superordinate level, only half the children in kindergarten 
and first grade sorted taxonomically. All of the third and fifth grade children 
sorted taxonomically at both the basic and superordinate levels. The reasons 
offered for the sorting were divided into taxonomic and nontaxonomic. It was 
found that at all ages, significantly fewer offered taxonomic reasons than 
sorted correctly. Again developmental changes in sorting occurred only at the 
superordinate level. It appears that basic level sorting is independent of 
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superordinate sorting. At the basic level, sorting occurs at a very young age. 
Mervis and Crisafi (1982) confirmed that preschool children sorted at the 
basic level more accurately than at the superordinate or subordinate levels. 
The basic level was found to be more differentiated than either the 
superordinate or subordinate level. 
Words encoding basic levels of categorization are the first words used to 
and by children. Rosch et al. (1976) reanalyzed a corpus of Sarah's (Brown, 
1973) stage I spontaneous speech. The analysis included superordinate, basic 
and subordinate references of nine categories. Essentially only basic level 
words were used. Callanan (1985) found that parents use basic level terms in 
naming concepts for children. She studied mothers' concept teaching patterns 
with their three to four year old children. Mothers used significantly more 
basic level terms in teaching all basic and superordinate concepts. In general 
mothers used as many or more basic level terms when teaching the 
superordinate as when teaching the basic level concepts. This was true for 
familiar and nonfamiliar names. It was thought that mothers' anchored their 
explanations at the basic level when teaching a new superordinate category. 
Smith and Rizzo (1982) studied preschool and kindergarten children's 
hierachical organization of nouns. They suggested that preschool and 
kindergarten children's simultaneous representation of class and included 
subclasses is quite robust. Clark, Gelman and Lane (1985) demonstrated that 
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children as young as two years and six months are capable of taxonomically 
subdividing and organizing simple categories based on linguistic information. 
When novel modifier-head compound words were introduced to preschool 
children, 49% of the two year olds, 85% of the three year olds and 96% of the 
four year olds could appropriately identify referents based soley on this 
linguistic information. Thus, this information is reliably used to 
subcategorize. 
Children's classification has also been studied at the superordinate level. 
Many researchers have confirmed Inhelder and Piaget's (1964) claim that 
young children do not as readily sort objects at the superordinate level. 
Developmental differences in usage also emerge at the superordinate level. 
There is a general developmental tendency for superordinate groups to move 
from more perceptually, situationally and functionally based to more abstract 
verbally based. Superordinate level sorting occurs before superordinate 
naming and both sorting and naming show developmental changes (Rosch et 
al., 1976). The linguistic cues that notify the listener that a superordinate set is 
being requested are understood differently by children of different ages (Smith 
& Rizzo, 1982). Young preschool children rarely assign words to a 
superordinate class but with increasing age this is level is used. 
Olver and Homsby (1966) report two studies of classification development. 
Both of these studies involved the development of semantic and syntactic 
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features. The semantics of classification involves the features of events and 
objects that link them within a common group. It was found that the use of 
singular perceptual attributes was initially strong in forming these links but 
the use of functional and multiple attributes increased steadily with age. The 
syntax of classification involves the formal rules of grouping the structure of 
the class structure. Grouping by subordination and functional grouping 
steadily increased with age. 
Another reason children may fail to group objects at the superordinate 
level appears to be because they are incapable of uncovering criteria that can 
serve as the basis for classification. This differs markedly from Inhelder and 
Piaget's (1964) claim that the children are incapable of adhering to the same 
criterion throughout classification. At the basic level, the children recognize 
salient properties of shape and relative size. These categories have 
perceptually clear cut boundaries (Rosch et al., 1976). The superordinate 
categories have more dimensions that need to be ignored (McGarrigle, Grieve 
& Hughes, 1978; Rosch et al., 1976). Therefore, the argument becomes not 
whether one can sort on a single, stable criterion but which criteria need to be 
considered (Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983, Rosch et al., 1976). It is possible that 
in some situations the information processing demands are too great (Horton 
& Markman, 1980) or that the children have poor strategic skills (Anglin, 1977; 
Cameron, 1981; Flavell & Wellman, 1977; Storm, 1978). 
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Contextual Research 
Roth and Shoben (1983) suggest that existing models of classification need 
to be modified to account for the influence of context. The different contexts 
may call for a variety of processing forms. Using adult subjects. Roth and 
Shoben (1983) demonstrated that context influences the ordering of what is 
seen as representative among category exemplars. Typicality ratings without 
context did not correspond to those ratings when context was introduced. For 
this reason, context representation is an important determiner of how easily 
an exemplar can be identified as a category member. As the context becomes 
more constrained, the referents become specific. 
Barsalou (1982) proposed that semantic concepts contain context 
independent and context dependent features. Context independent semantic 
features are activated by a word in all instances. These features form the basic 
core of the word meaning. Context dependent semantic features are activated 
only by relevant word contexts. These features are a source of semantic 
encoding variability. 
Environmental scenes form the context for objects. Scenes are 
informationally rich concerning objects' space and activities. Tversky and 
Hemenway (1983) suggest that the scenes possess a family resemblance 
relationship like objects do. Scenes have parts that underlie their appearance 
and the activities which are appropriate to them. Cities have streets and 
41 
stores. People work and purchase things there. Parks have trees, grass and 
toys. People relax and play there. Support for a scene taxonomy was found by 
Tversky and Hemenway (1983). Adults taxonomically grouped scenes in a 
manner analogous to object grouping (Rosch &c Mervis, 1975). Adults also 
have a preferred or basic level for scenes. When asked to list scene attributes 
and activities, subjects listed more features and actions for the basic level than 
they did for superordinate level. At a superordinate level, such as indoors and 
outdoors, there are fewers parts or actions which are shared. At the 
subordinate level, such as dty park vs. a county park, the differences are 
statistically insignificant. Adults were also asked to label photos of scenes and 
complete sentences describing activities performed in scenes. It was found that 
they preferred to use basic level terms even when more specific or general 
terms would have been appropriate. Therefore, the basic level of scenes is the 
level with the highest cue validity. It is where primary distinctions are made. 
There is some support for a developmental progression for scene 
categorization. Hock, Romanski, Galie & Williams (1978) used a recognition 
memory task with contextual arrangement of multi-object scenes. They found 
real world object arrangement involves a generalizable rule system which 
specifies the physically plausible relations among objects. Further, there are 
developmental differences in the effect of real world object arrangements on 
the formation of scene representations. They found support for a two stage 
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model somewhat analogous to the use of basic level categorization before the 
emergence of superordinate classification. In the earlier stage, the children 
generated a relational schematic representation of a scene. Like basic level 
categorization, they were able to differentiate possible and nonpossible scenes. 
During the later stage, children were able to further offer detailed information 
in possible novel scenes that are different from the familiar scenes. 
In summary, current research substantiates the role of family resemblance 
and prototypicalty in the internal structure of categories. Family resemblance 
has been shown to be a major variable in adults' categorization. It has not been 
studied in children's categorization. Prototypicality is a major variable in the 
categorization of adults and children. In adult categorization, prototypicality 
and family resemblance have been found to be directly related. The 
relationship between prototypicality and family resemblance has not been 
studied developmentally. 
The family resemblance structure can be analyzed by comparing the 
number of different parts and actions of different objects and scenes. Adult 
subjects list significantly more attributes at the basic level than they do at the 
superodinate level. This research has not been done using children as 
subjects. 
Scenes serve as entities for categorization. They also serve as the context 
for objects. The role of context in categorization has also been studied. In 
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studies using adults as subjects as well as those using children as subjects, 
context has been shown to affect categorization. No study to date has 
specifically looked at how context affects prototypicality. 
This study investigates four issues. The first issue is whether children of 
different ages differ in the number of attributes they mention at the basic and 
superordinate levels for objects and scenes. The second issue considers 
whether children of any age list significantly more attributes for basic level 
categories than they do for superordinate level categories. The third issue 
investigates whether the most protytpical category members are those with the 
most attributes in common wiûi other members of that category. The final 
issue studies whether the item identified by children as the most prototypical 
will differ dependent upon the context provided by background scenes. 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Subjects 
A total of 104 students at each of the following grades, kindergarten (18 
males and 18 females), second (18 males and 15 females) and fourth (18 males 
and 17 females) from a rural midwestem elementary school, participated in 
the study. All subjects participated in all of the tasks. All subjects were 
monolingual English speakers. None of the subjects were receiving special 
education services. 
Design 
The design used is a 3 (age) x 2 (sex) x 2 (type of task) x 2 (levels of 
categorization) factorial design. Type of task (object versus scene) and level 
of categorization (basic versus superordinate) are within-subject factors while 
age and sex form the between-subject factors. Control for order effects was 
obtained by complete counterbalancing of tasks and levels. 
Materials 
Objççt? 
Objects were miniature toys chosen from the vehicle and furniture 
categories. The vehicles included car, tricycle and tractor. The furniture toys 
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included a table, a chair and a £ree standing mirror. The objects were all of 
the same color and approximately of the same size. The items within each 
category were chosen for two reasons. Each of the object items was 
considered to be well known to the subjects. Secondly, Uyeda and Mandler 
(1980) found among college students clear evidence of differences in the 
extent to which each item in both the vehicle and furniture categories was 
considered to be a good example of that category. For the vehicle items, car 
was judged to be the best example. For furniture items, chair was judged to 
be the best example. 
Scenes 
To represent the different scenes 8 x 10 photo prints were used. Photos 
of three indoor and three outdoor scenes common to the subjects were 
selected from a large pool of photos. These represent the unanimous 
selections of three independent judges using the criteria of clarity of picture, 
typicality of scene and comprehensiveness of scene. Outdoor scenes include 
a park, a dty, and a farm. Indoor scenes include a home, a restaurant and a 
clothing store. 
Tasks and Tasks' Instructions 
For each item used during the administration of the tasks, either the 
subjects spontaneously provided the name of the item or the experimenter 
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told the name of the item. Each of the subjects was told that for each of the 
following tasks there were no right or wrong answers and that the 
experimenter was only interested in what they thought about these objects. 
The Number of Different Parts/Actions Basic Level Tasks 
1. The Single Object Parts Task 
For each item in the vehicle and furniture categories, each subject was 
asked to list some of the parts of the item. Directions were as follows: 
Tell me some of the parts of fa cart 
2. The Single Object Actions Task 
After they listed parts, the subjects were asked to offer actions associated 
with each object. Directions were as follows: 
Tell me what this does. Tell me what you can do with it. 
3. The Single Scene Parts Task 
For each item in the indoor scene and outdoor scene categories, each 
subject was asked to list some of the parts of the scene. Directions were as 
follows: 
Tell me some of the parts of (a park) . 
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4. The Single Scene Actions Task 
After they listed parts, the children were asked to offer actions associated 
with each scene. Directions were as follows: 
Tell me what you can do here. Tell me what you can do in a place like this. 
The Number of Different Parts/Acrions Superordinate Level Tasks 
Each child was presented with all six items of the furniture and vehicles 
categories laid out in random order in front of the child. The following 
directions were used: 
Here are some objects. Put together the ones that go together, the ones that are the same kind of 
thing. 
The child was encouraged to use all objects in his/her grouping. 
If the child sorted by vehicle and furniture object categories, further 
questioning followed to establish the child's names for each group. The 
following instructions were given while the experimenter pointed to the 
group and stated. 
What's a name for all of these together? All of these are ? 
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If the child did not spontaneously sort using vehicle and furniture groups, 
then the experimenter placed the objects in their respective taxonomic 
groups and the children were then asked to label the groups. For objects, the 
children mostly provided the names but for the scenes, the experimenter 
mostly provided the names. After the sorting, children were asked to list the 
features that were characteristic of each group. 
1. The Vehicle Parts Tasks 
For the vehicles, each subject was asked to list some of the parts common 
to that group. The directions were accompanied by the experimenter 
pointing to the three vehicles and stating as follows: 
Tell me some of the parts of these that are the same, the parts that are alike. 
2. The Vehicle Actions Task 
After they listed parts for the vehicles, the children were asked to offer 
actions associated with that group. Directions were accompanied by the 
experimenter pointing to the vehicle group and stating: 
Tell me what these do that are the same. Tell me what you can do with all three of these 
that are alike. 
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3. The Furniture Parts Task 
For the furniture items, each subject was asked to list some of the parts 
common to that group. The directions were accompanied by the 
experimenter pointing to the three pieces of furniture and stating as follows: 
Tell me some of the parts of these that are the same, the parts that are alike. 
4. The Furniture Actions Task 
After they listed parts common to the furniture, the children were asked 
to offer actions associated with that group. Directions were accompanied by 
the experimenter pointing to the furniture group and stating: 
Tell me what these do that are the same. Tell me what you can do with all three of these 
that are alike. 
5. The Indoor Parts Task 
For the indoor scenes each subject was asked to list some of the parts 
common to that group of scenes. The directions were accompanied by the 
experimenter pointing to the three pictures and stating as follows: 
Tell me some of the parts of these that are the same, the parts that are alike. 
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6. The Indoor Actions Task 
After they listed parts for the indoor scenes, the children were asked to 
offer actions associated with that group. Directions were accompanied by the 
experimenter pointing to the indoor scene pictures and stating: 
Tell me what these do that are the same. Tell me what you can do with all three of these 
that are alike. 
7. The Outdoor Parts Task 
For the outdoor scenes each subject was asked to list some of the parts 
common to that group of scenes. The directions were accompanied by the 
experimenter pointing to the three outdoor scene pictures and stating as 
follows: 
Tell me some of the parts of these that are the same, the parts that are alike. 
8. The Outdoor Actions Task 
After they listed parts for the outdoor scenes, the children were asked to 
offer actions associated with that group. Directions were accompanied by the 
experimenter pointing to the indoor scene pictures and stating: 
Tell me what these do that are the same. Tell me what you can do with all three of these 
that are alike. 
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Tbf Protptyplwtity Tmsk 
1. The No Context Prototvpicalitv Task 
For each of the categories of vehicles, furniture, indoor scenes and 
outdoor scenes, the children were presented with the three items of that 
category and were asked the following question: 
Look at these three things, which one do you think is the best example of this group? 
2. The Context Prototvpicalitv Task 
All three items of the object categories were paired with each individual 
scene. For each combination of objects and a scene, the children were asked 
to indicate the best example within each object group. The directions were as 
follows: 
In/At fa city) . which one do you think is the best example of this group (e.g. car, 
tractor, tricycle)? 
Procedure 
Testing 
The children were individually tested outside their classroom. To control 
for order effects, complete counter balancing was used for boys and girls 
separately within each grade. The order of the three groups of tasks (family 
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resemblance basic level tasks, family resemblance superordinate level tasks 
and prototypicality tasks) was completely counter balanced. Within each of the 
three groups of tasks, the order of the individual tasks was also completely 
counterbalanced with the restriction that the listing of parts and actions for 
basic level and superordinate level did not follow each other. Total time 
needed to administer the tasks was approximately twenty to twenty-fîve 
minutes. 
Scoring 
1. Number of Different Parts and Actions Score 
For each object and each scene all parts and actions mentioned by each 
subject were listed. All attributes, either parts or actions, which were not 
mentioned by at least two subjects were deleted from the tabulation. Each 
attribute listed by a subject was considered no more than one time per object or 
scene. 
The number of different parts and actions was the number of different 
attributes mentioned by each subject. For example, wheels and horn are two 
different parts while drive and ride are two different actions. Number of 
different parts and actions was tabulated for each subject and for each age 
group. 
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2. Family Resemblance Scores 
Family resemblance scores were derived from the subjects' responses on 
the number of different parts and actions tasks (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). For 
each object or scene all parts and actions mentioned by each subject were listed. 
All attributes, either parts or actions, which were not mentioned by at least two 
subjects were deleted from the tabulation. 
The number of different parts/actions was computed for each age group 
separately and for the total sample. If the analysis was an overall family 
resemblance score, where grade was not a factor, then if any two of the subjects 
listed the same attribute, it was considered. However, if the subjects' grade was 
a factor, then two subjects within a grade had to mention the attribute for it to 
be included within the analysis. 
Each attribute received a score or weighting Arom 1 to 3 representing the 
number of items within the category which had been credited with that 
attribute. For example, if "wheels" was mentioned by at least two people for 
trike, tractor and car, it was given a weight of 3. If "windows" was mentioned 
by at least two people for tractor and car but not for trike, it was given a weight 
of 2. If "hitch" was mentioned by at least two people for tractor, but not for 
trike and car, it was given a weight of 1. By this means each attribute was 
weighted according to the number of items in that category which possessed it. 
The basic measure of family resemblance for an object or scene was the sum of 
the weighted scores of the attributes listed for that item. 
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3. PTQtgtypiffUtySwreg 
Prototypicality scores were obtained from subjects' rating of goodness of 
example of category items. The basic measure of prototypicality for an item 
was the sum of the ratings for that item. For example, if 26 subjects thought 
car was the best example of the vehicle group, it would have a score of 26. 
Separate scores were derived for each subject pool. If grade was not a factor, all 
subjects' ranks were considered. However, if grade were a factor, only the 
prototypicality ratings for that grade were considered. 
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RESULTS 
Number of Different Attributes at the Basic Level 
Are there age differences in the number of different attributes at the basic 
level for objects and scenes? For each object or scene all parts and actions 
mentioned by each subject were listed. All attributes which were not 
mentioned by at least two subjects were deleted from the tabulation. Each 
attribute listed by a subject was considered no more than one time per object 
or scene. The appendix contains all the mean scores and standard 
deviations. 
Number of Different Object Attributes at the Basic Level 
Tables 1 through 4 present the ANOVA results for the number of 
different object parts and actions at the basic level for both the vehicle and 
furniture categories. Grade was signiHcant except for furniture actions 
where it approached significance. There was a significant sex effect for 
vehicle and furniture parts but not for vehicle and furniture actions, with 
boys mentioning more parts than girls. None of the grade by sex interactions 
were significant. 
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Table 1. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Different Parts at the 
Basic Level for Vehicles 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Prob>F 
Grade 661.709 2 330.854 13.554 0.000 
Sex 177.405 1 177.405 7.268 0.008 
Grade X Sex 127.233 2 63.616 2.606 0.079 
Error 2392182 98 24.410 
Total 3358.529 103 
Table 2. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Different 
Actions at the Basic Level for Vehicles 
Source Sum of Degrees of Mean F-Ratio Prob>F 
Squares Freedom Squares 
Grade 39.101 2 19.550 6.089 0.003 
Sex 7.080 1 7.080 2.205 0.104 
Grade X Sex 5.073 2 2.537 0.790 0.457 
Error 314.659 98 3.210 
Total 365.913 103 
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Table 3. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Different 
Parts at the Basic Level for Furniture 
Source Sum of Degrees of Mean F-Ratio Prob>F 
Squares Freedom Squares 
Grade 329.671 2 164.836 21.741 0.000 
Sex 7.653 1 7.653 1.009 0.028 
Grade X Sex 24.430 2 12,215 1.611 0.205 
Error 743.004 98 7.582 
Total 1104.760 103 
Table 4. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of 
Different Actions for Furniture 
Source Sum of Degrees of Mean F-Ratio Frob>F 
Squares Freedom Squares 
Grade 8.504 2 4.252 2.456 0.091 
Sex 0.215 1 0.215 0.114 0.736 
Grade X Sex 9.253 2 4.627 2.457 0.091 
Error 184.555 98 1.883 
Total 202.529 103 
The significant grade differences were further evaluated using t-tests (see 
Table 5). The fourth grade students mentioned significantly more parts and 
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actions than either the kindergarten or second grade students for vehicle 
parts, vehicle actions and furniture parts. The second graders differed 
significantly from the kindergarteners only for the number of different 
furniture parts mentioned. For vehicle parts and actions there were no 
significant differences between kindergarten and second grade students. For 
furniture parts all of the grade differences were significant. 
Tables. 
T-tests for Basic Level Object Parts and Actions 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Vehicle Farts 
Kindergarten 1.726 
Second Grade 
Fourth Grade 
Vehicle Actions 
Kindergarten .784 
Second Grade 
Fourth Grade 
Furniture Farts 
Kindergarten 3.637*** 
Second Grade 
Fourth Grade 
Note: * denotes significance at the.05 level,** denotes significance at the 
.01 level and *** denotes significance at the .001 level. 
The number of parts and the number of actions were correlated with 
each other for both vehicles and furniture. Table 6 shows the correlation 
coefficients and associated significance levels. 
4.935*** 
3.114** 
2484* 
3.209** 
6.769*** 
3.010** 
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coefficients and associated significance levels. 
Table 6. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Object Parts and Actions 
Zero Order Partial 
Correlations Correlations 
Controlling Controlling Controlling For 
For Grade For Sex Sex and Grade 
Vehicle Parts 
and Actions 360*** .295»*» .338»** .268»* 
Furniture Parts 
and Actions .009 -.052 .005 -.056 
Note: * denotes significance at the.05 level/» denotes significance 
at the .01 level and *** denotes significance at the .001 level. 
As can be seen in Table 6, the number of different parts mentioned for 
the vehicle items is significantly associated with the number of actions 
mentioned for the vehicle items; the same is not the case with the furniture 
items. 
Number of Different Scene Attributes at the Basic Level 
The ANOVA results for possible age and sex differences for number of 
parts and actions at the basic level for scenes are shown in Tables 7 through 
10. As the tables show, grade is always significant, sex is never significant 
and there is a significant grade and sex interaction effect for number of 
different inside scene parts. For both kindergarten and second grade 
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students, the girls listed more parts than the boys, while for fourth grade 
students the boys listed more parts than the girls. The fourth grade boys 
listed many more parts than either the second grade or kindergarten boys. 
Tablez. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Different Parts 
at the Basic Level for Outside Scenes 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Prob>F 
Grade 1134.350 2 567.175 9.789 0.000 
Sex 8.778 1 8.778 0.151 0.698 
Grade X Sex 189.559 2 94.780 1.636 0.200 
Error 5678.073 98 57.939 
Total 7010.760 103 
Tables. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Different Actions 
at the Basic Level for Outside Scenes 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Prob>F 
Grade 133.414 2 66.707 7.254 0.001 
Sex 5.871 1 5.871 0.638 0.426 
Grade X Sex 32.385 2 16.192 1.761 0.177 
Error 901.214 98 9.196 
Total 1072.885 103 
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Table 9. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Different Parts 
at the Basic Level for Inside Scenes 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Prob>F 
Grade 775.304 2 387.652 7.501 0.001 
Sex 13.961 1 13.961 0.270 0.604 
Grade X Sex 462.159 2 231.079 4.471 0.014 
Error 5064.537 98 51.679 
Total 6315.961 103 
Table 10. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Different Actions 
at the Basic Level for Inside Scenes 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Prob>F 
Grade 73.841 2 36.920 9.520 0.000 
Sex 7.906 1 7.906 2.039 0.109 
Grade X Sex 0.423 2 0.211 0.054 0.947 
Error 380.051 98 3.878 
Total 462.221 103 
To further analyze the significant grade differences, t-tests were conducted. 
Table 11 shows the t-test results. 
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Significant differences were found between the fourth grade students and 
the kindergarteners for outside scene parts, inside scene parts and inside scene 
actions. For outside scene actions there were no significant differences 
between the kindergarten and fourth grade students. The difference between 
the fourth grade and the second grade students was significant in all cases. 
Between the kindergarten and second grade students there was a significant 
difference only for outside scene actions. 
Table 11. 
T-tests for Grade Differences in Number of 
Basic Level Scene Parts and Actions 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Outside Scene Farts 
Kindergarten 1.004 4.305»»» 
Second Grade —— 3.214»» 
Fourth Grade 
Outside Scene Actions 
Kindergarten 2054» 1.725 
Second Grade 3.728»» 
Fourth Grade 
Inside Scene Farts 
Kindergarten .556 2.974»» 
Second Grade 3.462»»» 
Fourth Grade 
Inside Scene Actions 
Kindergarten 1.157 4.435»»» 
Second Grade 3.190»» 
Fourth Grade 
Note: * denotes significance at the.05 level/* denotes significance at the 
.01 level and *** denotes significance at the .001 level. 
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The number of scene parts and scene actions was correlated. Table 12 
shows the results. The number of parts and the number of actions are 
significantly correlated for outside scenes, but not for inside scenes. 
Table 12. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Scene Parts and Actions 
Zero Order Partial 
Correlations Correlations 
Controlling Controlling Controlling 
For Grade For Sex For Sex and Grade 
Inside Scene Parts 
and Actions .148 .042 .143 .035 
Outside Scene Parts 
and Actions .358**» .325*»* .361*** .328*** 
Note: * denotes significance at the.05 level/* denotes significance at the 
.01 level and *** denotes significance at the .001 level. 
Number of Different Object Attributes at the Superordinate Level 
The number of different parts and actions listed at the superordinate 
level for objects and scenes were also analyzed with a 3 (grade) x 2 (sex) 
analysis of variance. Grade was significant except for furniture actions. Sex 
was not significant and there were no significant grade by sex interaction 
effects. Tables 13 through 16 show the results. The appendix contains the 
mean scores and standard deviations. 
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Table 13. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of 
Different Superordinate Vehicle Parts 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Frob>F 
Grade 16.452 2 8.226 13.470 0.000 
Sex 0.760 1 0.760 1.245 0.091 
Grade X Sex 1.850 2 0.925 1.513 0.225 
Error 59.851 98 0.611 
Total 78.913 103 
Table 14. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of 
Different Superordinate Vehicle Actions 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Frob>F 
Grade 4.098 2 2.049 6.013 0.003 
Sex 0.137 1 0.137 0.406 0.528 
Grade X Sex 0.028 2 0.014 0.040 0.961 
Error 33.392 98 0.341 
Total 37.654 103 
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Table 15. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of 
Different Superordinate Furniture Parts 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Prob>F 
Grade 10.423 2 5.211 11.618 0.000 
Sex 0.163 1 0.163 0.364 0.548 
Grade X Sex 0.368 2 0.184 0.410 0.665 
Error 43.959 98 0.448 
Total 54.913 103 
Table 16. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of 
Different Superordinate Furniture Actions 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Prob>F 
Grade 1.295 2 0.647 1.432 0.244 
Sex 0.841 1 0.841 1.860 0.114 
Grade X Sex 0.769 2 0.385 0.851 0.430 
Error 44.315 98 0.452 
Total 47,221 103 
Table 17 shows the results of follow-up t-tests for vehicle parts, vehicle 
actions and furniture parts. The difference between kindergarten and fourth 
grade students was always significant. The difference between second and 
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fourth grade was significant for both vehicle and furniture parts. For both 
vehicle parts and actions the difference between kindergarten and second 
grade students was significant. 
Table 17. 
T-tests for Grade Differences in the Number of 
Different Attributes at the Superordinate Level 
Kindergarten Second Fourth 
Grade Grade 
Vehicle Farts 
Kindergarten — 2.407» 5.09*** 
Second Grade — 2.67*» 
Fourth Grade — 
Vehicle Actions 
Kindergarten — 2.294* 3.236** 
Second Grade — 1.380 
Fourth Grade — 
Furniture Parts 
Kindergarten — 1.709 4.407*** 
Second Grade — 3.209** 
Fourth Grade — 
Note: * denotes significance at the.05 level/* denotes significance at the 
.01 level and *** denotes significance at the .001 level. 
Number of Different Scene Attributes at the Superordinate Level 
Tables 18 through 21 present the ANOVA results for number of different 
scene attributes at the superordinate level. Grade was always significant. Sex 
was significant for inside scene parts. There was a significant grade by sex 
interaction effect for inside scene parts because the fourth grade boys listed 
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more parts than the fourth grade girls. The kindergarten boys listed 
significantly fewer parts than the kindergarten girls did. 
Table 18. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of 
Different Superordinate Outside Scene Parts 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Prob>F 
Grade 10.803 2 5.401 15.145 0.000 
Sex 0.093 1 0.093 0.262 0.610 
Grade X Sex 0.065 2 0.032 0.091 0.914 
Error 34.952 98 0.357 
Total 45.913 103 
Table 19. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Different 
Superordinate Outside Scene Actions 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Prob>F 
Grade 14.097 2 7.049 12.197 0.000 
Sex 0.767 1 0.767 1.327 0.102 
Grade X Sex 2.960 2 1.480 2.561 0.082 
Error 56.637 98 0.578 
Total 74.461 103 
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Table 20. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of 
Different Superordinate Inside Scene Parts 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Prob>F 
Grade 14.389 2 7.195 11.323 0.000 
Sex 0.696 1 0.696 1.067 0.049 
Grade X Sex 5.383 2 2.692 4.128 0.019 
Error 63.907 98 0.652 
Total 84.375 103 
Table 21. 
Analysis of Variance for the Number of Different 
Superordinate Inside Scene Actions 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean 
Squares 
F-Ratio Prob>F 
Grade 3.812 2 1.906 4.903 0.009 
Sex 0.009 1 0.009 0.023 0.880 
Grade X Sex 0.076 2 0.038 0.097 0.907 
Error 38.093 98 0.389 
Total 41.990 103 
T-tests were done to further analyze the effect of grade. Table 22 shows the 
results for outside scene parts, outside scene actions, inside scene parts and inside 
scene actions. 
69 
In all cases the differences in number of different scene parts and actions 
listed by kindergarteners versus and fourth graders was significant. This was also 
true for the differences between kindergarten and second grade students. For 
both outside and inside scene parts, but not for outside and inside scene actions, 
the differences between second and fourth grade scores was significant. 
Table 22. 
T-test for Grade Differences in the Number of 
Different Attributes at the Superordinate Level 
Kindergarten Second Fourth 
Grade Grade 
Outside Scene Parts 
Kindergarten 
Second Grade 
Fourth Grade 
Outside Scene Actions 
Kindergarten 
Second Grade 
Fourth Grade 
Inside Scene Parts 
Kindergarten 
Second Grade 
Fourth Grade 
Inside Scene Actions 
Kindergarten 
Second Grade 
Fourth Grade 
2.970** 5.238**» 
2.793** 
4.056*** 4.487*** 
1.141 
2.559* 4.038*** 
2.424* 
2.801** 2.973** 
.476 
Note: * denotes significance at the.05 level,** denotes significance at the 
.01 level and *** denotes significance at the .001 level. 
Table 23 shows the zero order and partial correlations between object parts 
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and actions and scene parts and actions at the superordinate level. 
The zero order correlations between parts and actions were significant in 
all cases except for furniture parts and actions. When controlling for grade and 
for sex and grade, the correlations for furniture parts and actions and for inside 
scene parts and actions were still significant. When sex was partialled out, the 
correlations between vehicle parts and actions as well as outside scene parts 
and actions were significant. 
Table 23. 
Correlations Between Parts and Actions 
at the Superordinate Level 
Zero Order 
Correlations 
Partial 
Correlations 
Controlling Controlling Controlling 
For Grade For Sex For Sex and Grade 
Vehicle Parts and Actions 
.242»# .110 .249** .118 
Furniture Parts and Actions 
.098 .172» .091 .166» 
Inside Scene Parts and Actions 
.267»* .172» .266 .172» 
Outside Scene Parts and Actions 
.295»»» .146 .307»»» .159 
Note; » denotes significance at the.05 level,»» denotes significance at the 
.01 level and »»» denotes significance at the .001 level. 
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Comparison of the Number of Attributes at the Basic versus 
Superordinate Level 
The second major hypothesis investigated was whether children list 
significantly more different parts and actions for basic level categories than 
for superordinate level categories. Rosch and Mervis (1975) suggest that 
significantly more different parts and actions are listed for basic level 
categories than for superordinate level categories. 
Paired t-tests compared the number of different parts and actions listed 
for the basic level with those listed for the superordinate level. The method 
of analysis can be demonstrated using the number of parts listed for basic 
level and superordinate level vehicles. Vehicle basic level parts scores were 
obtained by adding the number of different parts each subject offered for each 
object. The number of different parts each subject listed for trike was added 
to his/her number of parts listed for car and his/her number of parts listed 
for tractor. This sum was divided by 3. In this way a mean basic level parts 
score was obtained for each subject. These basic level scores were compared 
with the number of different parts the same subjects listed for vehicles when 
trike, car and tractor were grouped together. Table 24 shows the means and 
standard deviations for vehicles by grade and Table 25 shows the paired t-test 
results for vehicles, and Tables 26 and 27 do the same for the furniture 
category. All the t-test results are highly significant. At all grade levels 
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subjects mentioned significantly more attributes at the basic level than at the 
superordinate level confirming Rosch and Mervis' hypothesis. 
The same method was used to analyze the different numbers of scene 
attributes listed by each subject at the basic level versus the superordinate 
level. Table 28 shows the means and standard deviations for basic level 
outside scenes by grade. Table 29 shows the paired t-test results for outside 
scenes. Tables 30 and 31 do the same for inside scenes. Again all of the 
results are highly significant, again confirming Rosch and Mervis' 
hypothesis. 
Table 24. 
Means and Standard Deviations for 
Vehicle Parts and Actions by Grade 
Vehicle Parts Vehicle Actions 
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
Basic Level 
Kindergarten 3.537 
Second Grade 4.242 
Fourth Grade 5.552 
Total Sample 4.439 
1.771 
1.537 
1.829 
1.903 
1.407 
1.242 
1.486 
1.381 
0.535 
0.356 
0.507 
0.481 
Superordinate Level 
Kindergarten 0.583 
Second Grade 0.969 
Fourth Grade 1.154 
Total Sample 1.029 
0.554 
0.770 
0.980 
0.875 
0.694 
0.969 
1.171 
0.942 
0.525 
0.467 
0.706 
0.604 
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Table 25. 
Paired T-Test By Grade 
Basic with Superordinate Basic with Superordinate 
Vehicle Parts Vehicle Actions 
Kindergarten 9.605»*» 5.959*** 
Second Grade 11.643*** 2.647* 
Fourth Grade 13.643*** 3.021** 
Total Sample 19.547*** 6.680*** 
Note: * denotes significance at the.05 level/* denotes significance at the 
.01 level and *** denotes significance at the .001 level. 
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Table 26. 
Means and Standard Deviations For 
Furniture Parts and Actions by Grade 
Furniture Parts Furniture Actions 
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
Basic Level 
Kindergarten 1.342 
Second Grade 2.101 
Fourth Grade 2.781 
Total Sample 2.067 
Superordinate Level 
Kindergarten 0.389 
Second Grade 0.636 
Fourth Grade 1.142 
Total Sample 0.721 
0.964 
0.733 
1.031 
1.092 
0.688 
0.488 
0.772 
0.730 
7.028 
6.727 
7.428 
7.067 
0.472 
0.515 
0.257 
0.413 
1.463 
1.039 
1.577 
1.402 
0.774 
0.712 
0.505 
0.677 
Table 27. 
Paired T-Test For Furniture Parts and Actions by Grade 
Furniture Parts Furniture Actions 
Kindergarten 
Second Grade 
Fourth Grade 
Total Sample 
5.39»»» 
9.26»»» 
7.40»»» 
12.08»»» 
23.64»»» 
31.33»»» 
26.23»»» 
44.13»»» 
Note: » denotes significance at the.05 level/» denotes significance at the.Ol 
level and »»» denotes significance at the .001 level. 
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Table 28. 
Means and Standard Deviations For Outside Scene 
Parts and Actions by Grade 
Outside Scene Parts Outside Scene Actions 
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
Basic Level 
Kindergarten 3.370 
Second Grade 3.919 
Fourth Grade 5.914 
Total Sample 4.401 
Superordinate Level 
Kindergarten 0.167 
Second Grade 0.485 
Fourth Grade 0.943 
Total Sample 0.529 
2.652 1.898 1.173 
1.920 1.404 0.671 
2.914 2.343 1.107 
2.750 1.891 1.076 
0.378 0.278 0.615 
0.507 0.909 0.678 
0.802 1.143 0.974 
0.668 0.769 0.850 
Table 29. 
Paired T-Tests By Grade 
Basic with Superordinate Basic with Superordinate 
Outside Scene Parts Outside Scene Actions 
Kindergarten 7.085*** 6.654*** 
Second Grade 10.146*** 3.427** 
Fourth Grade 9.207*** 4.900*** 
Total Sample 14.254*** 8.418*** 
Note: * denotes significance at the.05 level,** denotes significance at the. 
01 level and *** denotes significance at the .001 level. 
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Table 30. 
Means and Standard Deviations For Inside Scene 
Parts and Actions by Grade 
Inside Scene Parts Inside Scene Actions 
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
Basic Level 
Kindergarten 4.028 2.650 1.361 0.368 
Second Grade 3.687 1.931 1.535 0.618 
Fourth Grade 5.770 2.710 2.019 0.878 
Total Sample 4.506 2.610 1.638 0.706 
Superordinate Level 
Kindergarten 0.222 0.485 0.250 0.439 
Second Grade 0.545 0.564 0.606 0.609 
Fourth Grade 1.114 1.231 0.686 0.758 
Total Sample 0.625 0.905 0.510 0.638 
Table 31. 
Paired T-Tests by Grade 
Basic Level with Superordinate Basic Level with Superordinate 
Inside Scene Parts Inside Scene Actions 
Kindergarten 8.6503*** 10.801*** 
Second Grade 8.703** 5.829*** 
Fourth Grade 10.273*** 8.591*** 
Total Sample 15.574*** 13.797*** 
Note: * denotes significance at the.05 level/* denotes significance at the 
.01 level and *** denotes significance at the .001 level. 
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The Relationship of Family Resemblance and Prototypicality 
The major purpose of this part of the study was to investigate the 
relationship between family resemblance and rated prototypicality for objects 
and scenes. For children of different ages, are the most prototypical 
members of categories those with the most attributes in common with other 
members of that category? The mean scores and standard deviations are 
found in the appendix. 
Family resemblance scores were obtained in a manner described in detail 
in the methods section and similar to the method used by Rosch and Mervis 
(1975). For each object or scene all parts and actions mentioned by each 
subject were listed. Each attribute, part or action, received a score or 
weighting from 1 to 3 representing the number of items within the category 
which had been credited with that attribute. For example, if "wheels" was 
mentioned by at least two people for trike, tractor and car, it was given a 
weight of 3. If "windows" was mentioned by at least two people for tractor 
and car but not for trike, it was given a weight of 2. If "hitch" was mentioned 
by at least two people for tractor, but not for trike and car, it was given a 
weight of 1. Each attribute was thus weighted according to the number of 
items in that category which possessed it. The basic measure of family 
resemblance for an item was the sum of the weighted scores of the attributes 
listed for that item. Family resemblance scores were calculated for the total 
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sample and for each grade. The total family resemblance score is not the sum 
of the within grade scores. Each was scored separately. For each 
within-grade score two subjects had to mention an attribute for an object to 
have it included in the analysis. For the total sample two subjects over the 
entire age range had to mention an attribute for an object to have it included. 
Therefore, for the overall analysis, one kindergartener and one fourth grader 
could mention an attribute. This attribute would then be reflected in the 
overall analysis but not in either of the individual grade analyses. 
Prototypicality scores were obtained from subjects' rating of goodness of 
example of category items. The children were asked to "choose the one that's 
the best example of this group." The basic measure of prototypicality for an 
item was the sum of the ratings for that item. For example, if 26 subjects 
thought a car was the best example of the vehicle group, it would have a 
score of 26. As with the family resemblance ratings, separate scores were 
derived for each grade. If the analysis was an overall prototypicality score, 
where grade was not a factor, all subjects' ranks were considered. However, 
if grade was a factor, only the prototypicality ratings for that grade were 
considered. Table 32 shows the prototypicality and feunily resemblance scores 
for objects. Table 33 shows the prototypicality and family resemblance scores 
for scenes. 
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Table 32. 
Prototypicality and Family Resemblance Scores for Objects 
Object Parts Object Actions 
Family Prototypicality Family Prototypicality 
Resemblance Resemblance 
Vehicles 
Car 
Kindergarten 49 22 16 22 
Second Grade 55 20 29 20 
Fourth Grade 76 24 28 24 
Trike 
Kindergarten 26 10 26 10 
Second Grade 31 6 22 6 
Fourth Grade 21 2 15 2 
Tractor 
Kindergarten 48 4 26 4 
Second Grade 61 7 23 7 
Fourth Grade 55 9 32 9 
Furniture 
Chair 
Kindergarten 17 5 9 5 
Second Grade 18 8 7 8 
Fourth Grade 24 11 6 11 
Mirror 
Kindergarten 21 20 11 20 
Second Grade 18 15 10 15 
Fourth Grade 32 16 14 16 
Table 
Kindergarten 18 10* 18 10» 
Second Grade 29 10 19 10 
Fourth Grade 26 8 21 8 
* = one kindergarten student did not make a choice. 
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Table 33. 
Frototypicality and Family Resemblance Scores for Scenes 
Scene Parts Scene Actions 
Family Frototypicality Family Frototypicality 
Resemblance Resemblance 
Inside Scenes 
Clothing Store 
Kindergarten 29 2 17 2 
Second Grade 33 9 10 9 
Fourth Grade 56 14 17 14 
Restaurant 
Kindergarten 36 26 29 26 
Second Grade 45 13 15 13 
Fourth Grade 69 7 22 7 
Home 
Kindergarten 62 8 18 8 
Second Grade 51 11 14 11 
Fourth Grade 88 14 15 14 
Outside Scenes 
Park 
Kindergarten 42 24 23 24 
Second Grade 42 16 9 16 
Fourth Grade 59 8 25 8 
Farm 
Kindergarten 51 2 31 2 
Second Grade 48 6 21 6 
Fourth Grade 81 17 27 17 
City 
Kindergarten 38 9» 34 9* 
Second Grade 43 11 31 11 
Fourth Grade 39 10 35 10 
* = one kindergarten student did not make a choice. 
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Using the prototypicality and family resemblance scores, Pearson Product 
Moment correlations of these family resemblance scores and prototypicality 
scores were calculated for all categories. Table 34 shows the correlations for 
both object and scene categories, for the total sample and for each grade. In 
looking at the correlations, the small number of observations, 6 at each grade 
level and 18 for the total sample, has to be taken into account. 
Table 34. 
Correlations Of Object and Scene 
Family Resemblance And Prototypicality Scores 
Correlatons Correlations bv Grade 
Total Sample Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Objects 
Vehicles -.34» -.08 .26 .60» 
Furniture -.00 .21 -.09 -.15 
Scenes 
Outside Scenes -.06 -.38 -.27 .32 
Inside Scenes .07 .14 .22 -.03 
The only significant correlation was between prototypicality and family 
resemblance for the furniture category. Family resemblance and 
prototypicality scores were also correlated for each grade individually. 
Comparisons of Prototypes and Less Exemplar Members 
The third major question investigated was whether there are significant 
differences in the number of attributes listed for prototypes as compared to 
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less exemplar category members. It was hypothesized that as the central 
example, the most protoypical member was the one with the most attributes. 
Each subject's number of attributes listed for the prototype (car for 
vehicles and mirror for furniture) was compared to the mean of the number 
of parts or actions of the other two category members combined (No. Parts for 
Trike + No. Parts Tractor/ 2). Table 35 shows the mean values for the object 
prototypes in comparison to the mean values of the other two category 
members. Only for vehicle parts were there significantly more parts listed 
for the prototype. For both furniture parts and actions the prototype had 
significantly fewer parts and actions listed than the other two category 
members. This same analysis was conducted for each grade individually. 
For the vehicle category the second and fourth graders listed significantly 
more parts for the prototype than for the nonprototypical members. 
However, for furniture parts the results directly contradicted the hypothesis. 
This same was the case at the fourth grade level for furniture actions. 
For scene parts and actions, the same analysis was conducted. Table 36 
shows the category results. For outside scenes the number of actions listed 
was significantly more for the prototype than for the other two category 
members. For inside scene parts the prototype had significantly fewer parts 
listed than the mean of the other two category members. The other results 
were not significant. The only significant difference was for kindergarten 
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outside actions. The results do not confirm the hypothesis. 
Table 35. 
Mean No. of Object Parts and Actions for the Prototype as 
Compared to the Mean of the Other Category Members 
Prototype Other Category t-statisitic 
Mean Members Mean 
Vehicle Parts 
Kindergarten 4.028 3.292 1.714 
Second Grade 4.700 4.015 2.448* 
Fourth Grade 6.343 5.157 4.100»»» 
Total Sample 5.019 4.149 4.400»»» 
Vehicle Actions 
Kindergarten 1.361 1.403 -0.295 
Second Grade 1.364 1.273 0.828 
Fourth Grade 1.771 1.771 0.000 
Total Sample 1.500 1.485 0.191 
Furniture Parts 
Kindergarten 0.944 1.541 -3.909»»» 
Second Grade 1.909 2.197 -1.751 
Fourth Grade 2.686 2.828 -0.824 
Total Sample 1.836 2.183 -3.627»»» 
Furniture Actions 
Kindergarten 1.334 1.347 -0.122 
Second Grade 1.151 1.288 -1.392 
Fourth Grade 1.286 1.571 -2.314» 
Total Sample 1.260 1.404 -2.205» 
Note: * denotes significance at p>.05, ** significance at p>.01, *** 
significance at p>.001 
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Table 36. 
Mean No. of Scenes Parts and Actions for the Prototype as 
Compared to the Mean of the Other Category Members 
Prototype Other Category t-statisitic 
Mean Members Mean 
Outside Farts 
Kindergarten 3.528 3.292 0.653 
Second Grade 4.182 3.787 1.437 
Fourth Grade 5.828 5.957 -0.329 
Total Sample 4.510 4.347 0.815 
Outside Actions 
Kindergarten 2.416 1.638 2.606» 
Second Grade 1.273 1.470 -1.381 
Fourth Grade 2.543 2.243 1.352 
Total Sample 2.096 1.788 2.205» 
Inside Parts 
Kindergarten 3.611 4.236 -1.457 
Second Grade 3.364 3.848 -1.835 
Fourth Grade 5.686 5.814 -0.364 
Total Sample 4.231 4.644 -1.998 
Inside Actions 
Kindergarten 1.333 1.375 -0.468 
Second Grade 1.576 1.515 0.431 
Fourth Grade 2.171 1.943 1.154 
Total Sample 1.692 1.610 0.907 
Note: * denotes significance at p>.05, ** significance at p>.01, *** 
significance at p>.001 
Object Prototypes with Background Scenes 
In this part of the study the effect of context on rated prototypicality was 
investigated. It was hypothesized that the object chosen to be most 
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prototypical would differ depending upon the context provided by the 
background scene. Prototypicality ratings were obtained for each subject both 
with and without background scenes. In the without-background-scene 
condition, children were presented with the three objects within each category 
and asked to choose the best example of that group. In the 
with-background-scene condition, the children were again presented the three 
objects within each category. Only this time a background scene was placed 
behind the objects and the child was asked to choose the best example of the 
group in a place analogous to the one pictured. For the vehicle group of 
objects the background scenes were the outside scenes from the previous 
portion of this study (park, city, and farm). For the furniture group of objects, 
the background scenes were the inside scenes from the previous portion of the 
study (clothing store, restaurant and home). Prototypicality scores were 
obtained for category items with each background scene. 
Tables 37 and 38 contain the prototypicality score for each vehicle and 
furniture object. Each vehicle object can be seen in Table 37 both without and 
with each of the outside background scenes. Table 38 shows the furniture 
objects both without and with each of the inside scenes. The scores in both 
tables are shown for each grade and for the group as a whole. 
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Table 37. 
Prototypicality Scores With and Without Outdoor 
Background Scene For Vehicles 
Trike Car Tractor None 
Kindergarten 
Without Background 10 22 4 0 
With Background 
Farm 2 2 30 2 
aty 8 27 1 0 
Park 19 12 3 2 
Second Grade 
Without Background 6 20 7 0 
With Background 
Farm 0 1 32 0 
aty 3 28 2 0 
Park 23 8 2 0 
Fourth Grade 
Without Background 2 24 9 0 
With Background 
Farm 0 0 35 0 
aty 2 33 0 0 
Park 29 6 0 0 
Paired t-tests were used to compare each subject's prototypicality choice 
without a scene background with his or her prototypicality choice with a 
background. Table 39 shows these results by grade and for the total sample 
for vehicles with outside background scenes. 
For each grade and total sample, the results indicate that the children 
tended to choose significantly different best examples when a contextual 
scene was introduced. This was true for each of the objects and each of the 
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background scenes. 
Paired t-tests compared the prototypicality score for each furniture object 
without a scene background with the prototypicality score for each inside 
scene background. Table 40 shows these results by grade and for the total 
sample. The paired t-tests for furniture scores also indicate significantly 
different prototypicality choices when different background scenes were 
introduced. 
Table 38. 
Prototypicality Scores With and Without Indoor 
Background Scenes For Furniture 
Chair Table Mirror None 
Kindergarten 
Without Background 5 10 20 1 
With Background 
Clothier 5 5 23 3 
Home 12 16 7 1 
Restaurant 9 23 3 1 
Second Grade 
Without Background 8 10 15 0 
With Background 
Clothier 5 2 26 0 
Home 14 12 7 0 
Restaurant 10 23 0 0 
Fourth Grade 
Without Background 11 8 16 0 
With Background 
Clothier 6 1 28 0 
Home 18 7 10 0 
Restaurant 10 25 0 0 
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Table 39. 
Paired T-Test With and Without 
Background Scenes For Vehicle 
Trike Car Tractor 
Kindergarten 
Background Scene 
Farm 
City 
Park 
.72 
3.78» 
5.94»» 
-.07 
9.42»» 
3.34» 
12.67»» 
.58 
1.52 
Second Grade 
Background Scene 
Farm 
City 
Park 
.00 
12.32»» 
1.78 
-1.46 
21.94»» 
.90 
-3.20» 
1.31 
10.45»» 
Fourth Grade 
Background Scene 
Farm 
City 
Park 
.79 
1.28 
11.26»» 
-8.31»» 
16.31»» 
1.96 
12.67»» 
-3.45» 
-3.45» 
Total Sample 
Background Scene 
Farm 
City 
Park 
.69 
2.96» 
7.59»» 
-1.19 
20.78»» 
4.19»» 
33.51»» 
.55 
.97 
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Table 40. 
Paired T-Test Of Prototypicality Scores with 
Indoor Background Scenes for Furniture 
Chair Table Mirror 
Kindergarten 
Background Scene 
Clothier 
Home 
Restaurant 
Second Grade 
Background Scene 
Clothier 
Home 
Restaurant 
Fourth Grade 
Background Scene 
Clothier 
Home 
Restaurant 
Total Sample 
Background Scene 
Clothier 
Home 
Restaurant 
.00 
1.64 
1.40 
-.90 
1.53 
.57 
-1.41 
1.75 
-.22 
3.46** 
8.18»* 
5.17*» 
-1.07 
-1.07 
3.17* 
-2.48» 
.47 
4.07** 
-2.50* 
-.29 
4.07** 
1.85 
6.58** 
14.29** 
.21 
-4.09** 
-5.65»» 
2.77* 
-2.27» 
-5.16»» 
3.17»» 
-1.64 
-5.35»» 
15.98»» 
4.34** 
-1.30 
Generally, the results indicate children's prototypicality choices are 
relative. All of the ages included in this study had major differences in their 
prototypicality choice with the introduction of background scenes. This was 
true for all of the objects. 
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DISCUSSION 
This study examined children's internal structure of concepts for objects 
and scenes. The spedfîc questions were as follows: 1) Do children of 
different ages differ in the number of attributes they mention for objects and 
scenes at the basic and superordinate level? 2) Do children of any age list 
significantly more attributes for basic level categories than for superordinate 
categories? 3) Are the most prototypical members of categories those with 
the most attributes in common with other members of that category? To 
state the same question differently, is there a relationship between family 
resemblance and prototypicality for both objects and scenes? 4) What is the 
effect of context on rated prototypicality? Will the item identified as most 
prototypical differ dependent upon the context provided by background 
scene? 
Number of Different Attributes for Objects and Scenes 
at the Basic and Superordinate Levels 
The first hypothesis examined whether there are age differences in the 
number of different attributes (parts and actions mentioned) at the basic and at 
the superordinate level for objects and scenes. In this part of the study, the 
children were shown individual objects and shown individual scenes. They 
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were asked to list the parts and actions they associated with each object or 
scene. 
Basic Level 
For the basic level, the number of different part and action scores showed 
reliable age changes. The basic level is defined as the most inclusive level 
which reflects the structure of attributes perceived in the real world. The older 
children mentioned a greater quantity of different parts and actions than the 
younger children did. The number of different parts and actions mentioned 
for vehicles offers a good example of this trend. The fourth grade students 
mentioned significantly more vehicle parts and actions than did the 
kindergarten students or the second grade students. There was no significant 
difference between the kindergarten and second grade students in the number 
of different parts or actions listed. 
For inside scene parts, inside scene actions and for outside scene parts, but 
not outside scene actions, the same age trends were noted. Again, the fourth 
grade students offered significantly more parts and actions than the younger 
children did. The difference between kindergarten and second grade scores 
was not significant, while both of these younger age groups differed 
significantly from the fourth grade students. 
Several developmental studies suggest reasons why these age differences 
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occur. Andersen (1975) found that during the preschool and elementary years 
there was a clear developmental sequence in learning the boundaries between 
basic level category members. Bjorklund (1978) compared performance of 
kindergarten, third and sixth grade students in a study involving lists of 
categorically related words. The youngest children appeared to encode 
information on an instance by instance basis. They represented items in terms 
of category features but failed to use category labels to organize information for 
retention. In contrast, the older children used category information to increase 
their retention about basic level members. 
Further differences appear to be related to whether the attribute is a part or 
an action. Clearer diagnostic trends were noted for both object and scene parts. 
For all categories, significant differences were found between kindergarten and 
fourth grade students and between second grade and fourth grade students in 
the listing of number of different parts. For vehicle parts, inside scene parts 
and outside scene parts, the difference between the number of different parts 
listed by kindergarten and second grade students was not significant. 
Age trends for the listing of actions were found in fewer instances. 
Vehicle actions and inside scene actions mirrored the age trend found for 
object and scene parts. However, this was not true for outside scene actions 
and for furniture actions. No significant age differences were found for the 
listing of number of actions for the furniture category. The number of 
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different actions listed for outside scenes was significantly different between 
kindergarten and second grade. It was also significantly different between 
kindergarten and fourth grade. No significant difierences were found between 
fourth grade and second grade students. 
Superordinate Level 
Objects and scenes at the superordinate level were also analyzed for age 
differences in the number of parts and actions listed. In this portion of the 
study the objects and scenes were placed in superordinate level groups. The 
children were asked to tell parts and actions that were found in each of the 
categories. 
The same age trends found at the basic level were also found at the 
superordinate level. Significant differences were generally found among all 
grades. There were significant differences among all the grades for vehicle 
parts, outside scene parts and inside scene parts. For furniture parts, the 
kindergarten and second grade students did not differ significantly but both 
differed significantly from the fourth grade students. 
For vehicle actions, inside and outside scene actions, the fourth and 
second grade students did not dii^er significantly but both groups differed 
significantly from the kindergarten students. There were no significant age 
differences in the listing of number of different furniture actions. 
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Findings by Frith and Frith (1978) reaffirm these trends. They 
systematically compared the features children aged four to sixteen years used 
for classification. Even the youngest children attended to features of the 
objects and used them for sorting groups. However, the four year olds did not 
use features differentiating between classes at the superordinate level. By age 
sixteen, three or four independent dimensions were being used for 
classification. 
The age differences in this and other studies reaffirm children's increasing 
capability to apply categorization to more difficult stimulus sets. The 
superordinate level categories are more abstract. Fewer attributes are shared 
with other taxonomic members at the superordinate level. Younger students 
have more difficulty extracting the defining features. They lack sufficient 
experience with category exemplars to be aware of the properties which are 
more critical to category membership (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). 
Basic and Superordinate Level Differences 
The second hypothesis compared children's listing of attributes at the basic 
and superordinate levels. Do children of any age list significantly more 
attributes for basic level categories than for superordinate categories? It was 
hypothesized that for the three age groups of children tested the basic level 
scenes would be the most inclusive category level for attribute and action 
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clusters to occur. 
The number of different parts and actions were compared between the two 
hierarchical levels for each category. For each of the three age groups, there 
was a significant increase from superordinate to basic level in the number of 
different parts and actions listed. 
Clear differences were found in the number of different parts and actions 
listed for objects between basic and superordinate levels. The difference 
between basic and superordinate parts and basic and superordinate actions was 
significant for both furniture and vehicle categories. This was true for the total 
sample and for each grade. These robust findings support the hypothesis. 
The results for scenes paralleled those of objects. The children in this 
study offered significantly more different parts and actions at the basic level 
than at the superordinate level for both inside and outside scene categories. 
This was true for the total sample and for each grade. 
Object sets at the basic level are perceptually quite similar while at the 
superordinate level, this perceptual similarity might not exist. At the 
superordinate level children need to be guided by other cues (Horton & 
Markman, 1980). The perceptual diversity of the superordinate level concepts 
makes categorization more difficult at that level. Perhaps different processes 
may be involved for basic level than superordinate level categorization. At 
the basic level, category membership may be determined through a type of 
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template matching process. The exemplars are merely perceptually compared 
with prototypic members. At the superordinate level, a more systematic 
analysis may be necessary. Perhaps a list of defining criteria, features central to 
the category, needs to be consulted. When the requirements for systematic 
evaluation of exemplars against these defining criteria exceeds the ability of 
the developing child, developmental differences in categorization occur 
(Rosch et al., 1976). 
What might be involved is a process of reweighting semantic features 
(Anglin, 1977). The development of feature weighting arises as a by-product 
of exemplar commonality. The weighting of attributes is determined by their 
frequency and salience. As children increase their understanding concerning 
the importance of certain attributes, their knowledge about the attributes 
associated with the category also increases (Schwanenfiugel, Guth & 
Bjorklund, 1986). 
Another classification cue is function. The results of this study do not 
suggest that function is as strong a classification cue for these ages of children 
as parts are. The clearer differences for parts than for actions are consistent 
with the findings of Tversky and Hemenway (1983). They found that the 
dramatic increase in scores from the superordinate to the basic level was due 
to listing of parts rather than actions. Rosch (1978) further suggested that it is 
the increase in shared parts from superordinate to basic level that is diagnostic 
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of the basic level. This study finds support for this even with young children. 
All ages of children in this study named significantly more parts than actions. 
Major questions concerning the use of attributes in the categorization 
process remain. How do children apply the knowledge they have about 
associated attributes? Is this information differentially applied based on 
ordered criteria? In other words, do children first look for perceptual 
similarity, then functional similarilty and finally location similarity? At this 
time these questions remain unanswered. 
The Relationship of Prototypicality and Family Resemblance 
The third portion of this study looked at the relationship between 
prototypicality and family resemblance. It was predicted that the degree to 
which an object or scene possesses attributes in common with other category 
members should be highly correlated with its rated prototypicality within the 
category. For different ages of children, are the most prototypical members of 
categories those with the most attributes in common with other members of 
that category? If the relationship between family resemblance and 
prototypicality exists for objects, does it also exist for scenes? 
In a family resemblance relationship, each item has a minimum of one 
and usually more elements in common with other items in that category. At 
the basic level all three age groups of children established natural categories 
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based on a family resemblance structure. Some of the features mentioned 
within each category were ones common to other members of that same 
category. 
In the current study, the correlations between prototypical! ty and family 
resemblance scores indicated that this relationship is not clearly developed in 
early childhood. Generally, the correlations between family resemblance 
scores and prototypicality scores were not significant. Only for vehicles did 
family resemblance and prototypicality significantly correlate. 
Several factors need to be considered to explain these results. 
First, it is possible that prototypicality is a developmental concept. Rosch 
(1975,1978) has not allowed for a multi-stage encoding step. There is, 
however, support for a dual encoding step. Duncan and Kellas (1978) 
developmentally examined prototype changes in the internal structure of 
categories. Their subjects were second, fourth and sixth graders. The second 
grade students processed prototypes differently than the older children. 
Category knowledge did not facilitate their response to typical exemplars; it 
merely inhibited their responses to atypical exemplars. The older children 
used category knowledge to facilitate their response to typical exemplars and 
to inhibit their response to atypical exemplars. Duncan and Kellas (1978) 
suggest that encoding may be a two stage process. The first stage is perceptual 
encoding. This step appeared to be the same for all ages of subjects. The 
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second stage is a conceptual encoding stage. In this stage infonnation from a 
conceptual storage system is activated following the formation of a 
perceptual representation. These conceptual codes associate more abstract 
properties of a stimulus with the representation of the physical properties of 
a stimulus. These properties involve information relating to stimulus 
membership in a semantic category. 
In light of this theory, the younger students in the present study may 
have had difficulty extrapolating the defining features. Neither the 
kindergarten nor second grade students may have had sufficient experience 
with exemplars in these categories to be aware that some nonperceptual 
properties were more critical to their category membership than others. 
A second area for further research to explore involves the number of 
exemplars used. Children may need a larger quantity of basic level 
exemplars than were used in this study to form conclusions about 
prototypicality. In this study only three exemplars were used. Carson and 
Abrahamson (1976) found that class inclusion skills in children in grades one 
to four depended on the extent to which the objects were good exemplars of a 
category. In the Rosch and Mervis (1975) study for the categories of furniture 
and vehicles, twenty basic level exemplars were used. However with 
children, Rosch et al. (1976) used three basic level exemplars for each category 
and found that sufficient for them to use in basic level and superordinate 
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level categorization. 
Third/ future research should further consider the role of semantics. It is 
possible that the request to choose "the best example" in a group was 
interpreted by the children to choose the one with the most salient features 
or the one they found the most attractive. Support comes from the portion 
of the study that looked at the number of attributes and actions listed for the 
prototype in comparison with less exemplar category members. For objects, 
vehicle parts was the only part or action where there were significantly more 
parts listed for the prototype than for other category members. For scenes, 
outside actions was the only one where significantly more parts or actions 
were listed for the prototype than for other category members. 
Finally, the method of tabulating prototypicality choices may need some 
revisions. Rosch and Mervis (1975) had adults mark on a scale the degree to 
which each exemplar met their idea of the category. For young children, an 
alternative method would be to have the children choose the one that best 
shows the named category, then remove that choice and repeat the 
procedure as often as necessary. In that way a clear rank order of choices 
would emerge for each child. 
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Role of Context in Prototyping 
The final portion of the study looked at the effect of context. Scenes are 
not only taxonomic entities, they are also the context for objects. The objects 
contained in scenes often occur in rather predictable combinations (Tversky 
& Hemenway, 1983). This suggests that the choice of prototypes may be 
affected by scene context. In different contextual situations, the chosen 
prototype may difiFer. It was hypothesized that within each age group the 
most prototypical object would differ dependent upon the context provided 
by the background scene. 
In this study, the children consistently chose a different best example in a 
contextual situation than they chose in a noncontextual situation. This was 
true across all age groups. When outside scenes were used as a background, 
significantly more children chose a trike to go with a park and a dty, a car to 
go with a dty and park and a tractor to go with a farm. Across age groups the 
choice of car to go with a dty and tractor to go with a farm was consistent. In 
two of the age groups, choosing a trike to go with a park was also consistent 
Only the second grade children did not choose a trike to go with a park 
significantly more than they did without a background scene. 
When inside scenes were used with objects of furniture, dear prototype 
choice differences also emerged. Chair was chosen with each of the 
background scenes more often than it was chosen with no background scene. 
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Table was chosen more often for both home and restaurant. Mirror was 
chosen for clothing store and home. Within each age group, the major 
differences occurred for table and mirror. All age groups chose table more 
often as a prototype when it was associated with restaurant. They also chose 
mirror more than they had without a scene when it was associated with 
restaurant. 
Similar findings have emerged in other contextual studies. Davis (1983) 
studied the effect of context in children's drawings. Children from four to six 
years of age were shown arrays of cups and sugar bowls in various 
combinations and orientations. A combination of age and context was found 
significant in that study. The four year old children did not rely on 
contextually related information to differentiate the objects while the older 
children did. Studies that used adults as subjects have also confirmed the 
importance of context. Roth and Shoben (1983) found that context 
influenced the representative ordering of category exemplars. Tversky and 
Gati (1978) noted that context had direct impact on what adults chose to place 
together in taxonomic groups. Context enhances interpretation of 
conceptual relationships (Fisher & Silvern, 1985; Scarr & McCartney, 1983). 
It appears that the context also influences the interpretation of target 
prototypes. Contextual situations are the background scene for objects. 
Context influences prototype interpretation by implicitly emphasizing some 
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of its attributes (Barsalou, 1982). This supports the findings of Barclay, 
Bransford, Franks, McCarrell and Nitsch (1974). They found that sentence 
context influenced the interpretation of target nouns. When available, the 
categorical situation affects what features are found to be important in 
determining a prototype. They suggested that the prototype and its context 
form a higher order gestalt, similar to defining features. These defining 
features in turn reflect on what features are deemed important. There is 
ample evidence that this variable does effect prototypic choices. 
Summary And Conclusions 
This was a study of the development of internal structure of concepts in 
children. 
The results of this study support the functional importance of the basic 
level - superordinate level distinctions to describe the internal structure of 
taxonomies (Rosch et al., 1976). The scene categories appear to be organized in 
a manner similar to the object categories. 
The primacy of categorization at the basic level was also supported. The 
children in this study mentioned a greater quantity of different parts and 
actions for basic level objects and basic level scenes than they did for 
superordinate level objects and scenes. 
A relationship between family resemblance and prototypicality was found 
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only for fourth grade children. The kindergarten and second grade students 
showed this relationship less than the the fourth graders did. 
Finally, context appears to play a role in prototyping. Within categories, 
children make different prototyping decisions based upon the context. This is 
true even for the youngest children in this study. The specific role that context 
plays in conceptual organization needs further developmental study. 
This study offers developmental support for Rosch's theory of category 
structure. The use of features in natural category formation is a viable method 
for analyzing children's category formations. The use of a family resemblance 
model is warranted for developmental studies of object and scene categories. 
Developmental studies of category structure should also give further 
consideration to the role of prototypes, to the relationship between 
prototypicality and family resemblance and to the influence of context in 
prototypicality decisions. 
In an educational setting, children can use their categorization capabilities 
at a young age. Kindergarten children are able to categorize at the basic level, 
to state attributes common to objects within the same level, and to use 
prototypes in order to form basic category differences. Fourth grade students 
are able to categorize at both the basic and superordinate levels, to state 
attributes common to objects and scenes at each level and to use prototypes in 
order to form basic and superordinate category differences. Second grade 
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students are in the process of acquiring superordinate category structure. 
However, the process is not complete at this age. 
Kindergarten, second and fourth grade students do find scenes to be 
categorizable entities. The same developmental trends noted for objects also 
apply to scenes. Since children have less experience categorizing scenes, this is 
more difficult for them. 
Context does influence categorization decisions for all age groups of 
children. Therefore the setting needs to be considered when teaching 
categorization. Setting can also used as a cue when introducing new category 
elements, in teaching descriptions or in creative writing tasks. 
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APPENDIX MEANS TABLES 
Table 41. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different Basic Level 
Vehicle Parts and Actions by Grade and Sex 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Car Parts 4.056 2.859 4.000 2.765 5.000 1.609 4.467 2.100 7.278 2.675 5.353 2.029 
Trike Parts 3.111 1.568 2.500 1.823 4.167 1.465 3.667 .900 5.111 1.323 4.059 1.197 
Tractor Parts 3.556 2.007 4.000 2.497 4.500 2.640 3.533 1.685 6.944 2.555 4.412 1.121 
Car Actions 1.333 .594 1.444 1.042 1.444 .705 1.267 .594 1.944 .802 1.588 .712 
Trike Actions 1.556 1.042 1.500 .857 1.222 .732 1.200 .561 1.500 .985 1.294 .588 
Tractor Actions 1.444 .705 1.222 .548 1.500 .857 1.133 .516 2.389 1.420 1.882 .993 
Table 42. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Mirror Parts .944 .998 .944 1.056 1.944 .938 1.867 .743 2.944 1.589 2.412 1.064 
Chair Parts 2.056 1.392 1.389 1.243 2.278 .895 2.800 1.265 3.278 1.074 2.914 1.144 
Table Parts 1.222 1.263 1.222 .943 1.667 .686 2.133 .990 2.778 1.215 2.235 .903 
Mirror Actions 1.444 .784 1.278 .461 1.167 .383 1.133 .352 1.389 .608 1.716 .393 
Chair Actions 1.056 .236 1.389 .698 1.33 .352 1.167 .514 1.556 .922 1.176 .393 
Table Actions 1.278 .575 1.667 .970 1.400 .737 1.444 .616 1.889 .823 1.529 .717 
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Table 43. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different Basic Level 
Outside Scene Parts and Actions by Grade and Sex 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D, 
Farm Parts 2.833 2.813 4.111 3.142 4.444 2.332 4.267 1.944 7.889 4.536 6.059 3.631 
City Parts 2.389 1.650 3.556 4.817 2.889 2.026 3.600 1.639 5.444 3.650 4.353 2.317 
Park Parts 3.500 2.771 3.556 2.479 4.444 2.995 4.000 2.138 6.444 2.202 5.235 2.488 
Farm Actions 1.389 .778 1.722 .895 1.444 .616 1.533 .743 2.667 1.237 2000 1.000 
City Actions 1.389 .916 2.111 1.676 1.556 1.688 1.333 .724 1.944 .802 2.235 1.640 
Park Actions 2.000 1.328 2.833 2.662 1.333 .686 1.200 .561 2.667 1.572 2.412 1.698 
Table 44. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different Basic Level 
Outside Scene Parts and Actions by Grade and Sex 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Qoihing Store Parts 
2.167 1.295 4.333 2.787 2.667 1.455 3.267 2.314 5.500 3.185 4.235 2412 
Restaurant Parts 
3.111 2.494 4.111 4.028 3.056 1.434 3.733 2.789 6.944 3.171 4.353 1.618 
Home Parts 
4.167 3.053 6.278 3.545 4.867 2.774 4.722 2.396 7.222 3.590 6.235 3527 
Clothing Store Actions 
1.222 .428 1.500 .707 1.333 .686 1.200 .561 1.444 .856 1.941 1.029 
Restaurant Actions 
1.389 .608 1.278 .669 1.722 1.127 1.467 .640 2.000 .907 2.412 1.460 
Home Actions 
1.278 .575 1.500 .618 2.067 1.033 1.500 .857 2.278 1.320 2.294 1.263 
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Table 45. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different 
Basic Level Vehicle Parts and Actions by Sex 
Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Vehicle Parts 
Car 5.444 
Trike 4.130 
Tractor 5.000 
Vehicle Actions 
Car Actions 1.574 
Trike Actions 1.426 
Tractor Actions 1.778 
2.759 
1.649 
2.775 
.742 
.924 
1.110 
4.600 
3.380 
4.000 
1.440 
1.340 
1.420 
2.365 
1.524 
1.874 
.812 
.688 
.785 
Table 46. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different 
Basic Level Furniture Parts and Actions by Sex 
Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Furniture Parts 
Mirror 1.944 1.446 1.720 1.144 
Chair 2.537 1.239 2.340 1.394 
Table 1.889 1.254 1.840 1.037 
Furniture Actions 
Mirror 1.333 .614 1.200 .404 
Chair 1.259 .650 1.240 .517 
Table 1.537 .719 1.540 .813 
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Table 47. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different 
Basic Level Outside Scene Parts and Actions by Sex 
Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Outside Scene Farts 
Farm 5.056 
City 3.574 
Park 4.796 
Outside Scene Actions 
Farm 1.833 
aty 1.630 
Park 2.000 
3.926 
2.879 
2.903 
1.077 
1.202 
1.346 
4.820 
3.840 
4.260 
1.760 
1.920 
2.200 
3.102 
3.272 
2.448 
.894 
1.469 
1.990 
Table 48. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different 
Basic Level Inside Scene Parts and Actions by Sex 
Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Inside Scene Parts 
Clothing Store 3.444 
Restaurant 4.370 
Home 5.370 
Inside Scene Actions 
Clothing Store 1.278 
Restaurant 1.704 
Home 1.685 
2.582 
3.042 
3.281 
.627 
.924 
1.043 
3.980 
4.080 
5.840 
1.620 
1.720 
1.940 
2.519 
2.961 
3.322 
.830 
1.107 
1.038 
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Table 49. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different 
Basic Level Vehicle Parts and Actions by Grade 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Vehicle Parts 
Car 4.028 2.772 4.758 1.838 6.343 2.543 
Trike 2.806 1.704 3.939 1.248 4.600 1.355 
Tractor 3.778 2.244 4.061 2.277 5.714 2.436 
Vehicle Actions 
Car 1.389 .838 1.364 .653 1.771 .770 
Trike 1.528 .941 1.212 .650 1.400 .812 
Tractor 1.333 .632 " 1.333 .736 2.143 1.240 
Table 50. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Di^ erent 
Basic Level Furniture Parts and Actions by Grade 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Furniture Parts 
Mirror .944 1.013 1.909 .843 2.686 1.367 
Chair 1.722 1.344 2.515 1.093 3.114 1.105 
Table 1.222 1.098 1.879 .857 2.514 1.095 
Furniture Actions 
Mirror 1.361 .639 1.152 .364 1.286 .519 
Chair 1.222 .540 1.152 .442 1.371 .731 
Table 1.472 .810 1.424 .663 1.714 .789 
Table 51. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different 
Basic Level Outside Scene Parts and Actions by Grade 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Outside Scene Parts 
Farm 3.472 3.009 4.364 2.133 7.000 4.166 
City 2.972 3.598 3.212 1.867 4.914 3.081 
Park 3.528 2.591 4.242 2.610 5.857 2.390 
Outside Scene Actions 
Farm 1,556 .843 1.485 .667 2.343 1.162 
City 1.750 1.381 1.455 1.325 2.086 1.269 
Park 2.417 2.116 1.273 .626 2.543 1.615 
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Table 52. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different 
Basic Level Inside Scene Parts and Actions by Grade 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Inside Scene Parts 
Clothing Store 
3.250 2.407 2.939 1.886 4.886 2.867 
Restaurant 
3.611 3.340 3.364 2.148 5.686 2.826 
Home 
5.222 3.432 4.788 2.534 6.743 3.543 
Inside Scene Actions 
Clothing Store 
1.361 .593 1.273 .574 1.686 .963 
Restaurant 
1.333 .632 1.606 .933 2.200 1.208 
Home 
1.389 .599 1.758 .969 2.286 1.274 
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Table 53. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different 
Superordinate Level Parts and Actions by Grade 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Vehicles 
Parts .583 .554 .970 .770 1.543 .980 
Actions .694 .525 .970 .467 1.171 .707 
Furniture 
Parts .389 .688 .636 .489 1.143 .772 
Actions .472 .774 .515 .712 .257 .505 
Outside Scenes 
Parts .167 .378 .485 .508 .971 .891 
Actions .278 .615 .909 .678 1.029 .985 
Inside Scenes 
Parts .222 .485 .545 .564 1.114 1.231 
Actions .250 .439 .606 .609 .686 .758 
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Table 54. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different 
Superordinate Level Parts and Actions by Sex 
Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Vehicles 
Parts 1.111 .965 .940 .767 
Actions .907 .652 .980 .553 
Furniture 
Parts .759 .725 .680 .741 
Actions .500 .771 .320 .551 
Outside Scenes 
Parts .500 .575 .580 .835 
Actions .852 .920 .600 .728 
Inside Scenes 
Parts .704 1.057 .540 .706 
Actions .519 .637 .500 .647 
Table 55. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Different Superordinate Level Parts and 
Actions by Grade and Sex 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Vehicle Faits 
.667 .594 .500 .514 .889 .583 1.067 .961 1.778 1.215 1.294 .588 
Vehicle Actions 
.667 .485 .722 .575 .944 .639 1.000 .000 1.111 .758 1.235 .664 
Fumituie Parts 
.500 .857 .278 .461 .667 .485 .600 .507 1.111 .676 1.176 .883 
Furniture Actions 
.667 .970 .278 .461 .500 .786 .533 .640 .333 .485 .176 .529 
Outside Scene Parts 
1.111 .323 .222 .428 .444 .511 .533 516 .944 .539 1.000 1.173 
Outside Scene Actions 
.278 .461 .278 .752 .833 .707 .278 .754 1.444 1.0% .588 .618 
Inside Scene Parts 
.111 .323 .333 .594 .500 .514 .600 .632 1.500 1.425 .706 .849 
Inside Scene Actions 
.222 .428 .278 .461 .611 .698 .600 .507 .722 .669 .647 .862 
Table 56. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Object Prototypes By Grade and Sex 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Vehicles 
Car .667 .485 .556 .511 .556 .511 .667 .488 .722 .461 .647 .493 
Trike .167 .383 .389 .582 .167 .383 .200 .414 .000 .000 .118 .332 
Tractor .167 .383 .056 .236 .278 .461 .133 .252 .278 .461 .278 .461 
Furniture 
Mirror .556 .511 .667 .485 .389 .502 .533 .516 .333 .485 .588 .507 
Chair .167 .383 .111 .323 .333 .485 .133 .352 .389 .502 .235 .437 
Table .333 .485 .222 .428 .278 .461 .333 .488 .278 .461 .176 .393 
Table 57. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Scene Prototypes 
Kindergarten 
Boys Girls 
Second Grade 
Boys Girls 
Fourth Grade 
Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Outside Scenes 
Farm .111 .323 .056 .236 .167 .383 .200 .414 .444 .511 .471 .514 
City .333 .485 .222 .428 .278 .461 .222 .428 .278 .461 .235 .437 
Park .611 .502 .778 .428 .556 .511 .400 .507 .222 .482 .235 .437 
Inside Scenes 
Clothing Store .056 .236 .056 .236 .278 .461 .267 .458 .444 .511 .353 .493 
Restaurant .778 .428 .611 .507 .389 .502 .400 .507 .111 .328 .235 .437 
Home .167 .383 .333 .485 .333 .485 .333 .488 .444 .511 .353 .493 
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Table 58. 
Means and Standard Deviations for 
Object Prototypes By Sex 
Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Vehicles 
Car .648 .482 .620 .490 
Trike .111 .317 .240 .431 
Tractor .241 .432 .140 .351 
Furniture 
Mirror .426 .499 .600 .495 
Chair .296 .461 .160 .370 
Table .296 .461 .240 .431 
Table 59. 
Means and Standard Deviations for 
Scene Prototypes By Sex 
Boys Girls 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Outside Scenes 
Farm .241 
aty .296 
Park .463 
Inside Scenes 
Clothing Store .259 
Restaurant .426 
Home .315 
.432 .240 .431 
.461 .260 .443 
.503 .480 .505 
.442 .220 .418 
.499 .420 .499 
.469 .340 .479 
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Table 60. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Object 
Prototypes By Grade 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Vehicles 
Car .611 .494 .606 .496 .686 .471 
Trike .278 .454 .182 .392 .057 .356 
Tractor .111 .319 .212 .415 .257 .443 
Furniture 
Mirror .511 .494 .455 .506 .457 .505 
Chair .139 .351 .242 .435 .314 .471 
Table .278 .454 .303 .467 .229 .426 
Table 61. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Scene 
Prototypes By Grade 
Kindergarten Second Grade Fourth Grade 
Mean S.D. 
Outside Scenes 
Farm .083 .280 
aty .278 .454 
Park .694 .467 
Inside Scenes 
Clothing Store .056 .232 
Restaurant .694 .467 
Home .250 .439 
Mean S.D. 
.182 .392 
.303 .467 
.485 .508 
.273 .452 
.394 .496 
.333 .479 
Mean S.D. 
.457 
.257 
.229 
.505 
.443 
.426 
.400 .497 
.171 .382 
.400 .497 
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